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The law of watercourses is a law of streams as natural resources. The
water running therein unrestrained is the property of no one, but a
portion of it taken out of the stream and confined in the possession of an
individual becomes the taker's private property, belonging to him while
under his possession and control; and the law of watercourses is a
development of the rules under which one may thus take of the water and
make it his own.'
Samuel Wiel was the foremost commentator on California and western water
law in the first part of the twentieth century. His treatise on western states' water
rights, which is liberally consulted in this article, remains unequaled in its
exposition of the nature and development of property in water. The brief
description Wiel provides of the "law of watercourses," quoted above, simply
and accurately distills the essential nature of the water right as the right to take
water from a watercourse and water rights law as "the rules under which one may
thus take of the water [from a natural stream] and make it his own. 2 Ninety years
later, however, these simple propositions do not appear to be either broadly or
well understood. The recent United States Court of Federal Claims decision in
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Districtv. United States ("Tulare") provides a
particularly clear and instructive example. The purpose of this article is to take
the opportunity of the Tulare case to renew an understanding of these basic
propositions and, in so doing, to explain how and why the decision in Tulare
departed so widely from them.

1.
SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 1-2 (1911).
2. Id. at 2. The focus of Wiel's description, like that of this article, is on diversions where water is
removed from the watercourse and thereafter applied to some useful purpose like irrigation or municipal water
supply-the vast majority of diversions. It applies as well, however, to appropriations where the flow of water
is controlled but the water itself is never removed from the watercourse (such as appropriations to storage) and
the possession of water is not the immediate result. See infra notes 61, 74, 80, and 150.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In the American federal system of government, the creation and definition of
property rights are traditionally functions of state law.3 Thus, when actions by the
federal government are challenged under the Fifth Amendment to the United
States Constitution as a taking of property for public use for which just
compensation must be paid, federal courts are regularly required to first interpret
the laws of the individual states to determine the property rights that are claimed
to have been taken.4
As a rule, this task should not pose any special challenge for the federal
courts because property law principles are largely traditional, uniform, and wellknown. When, on the other hand, a case involves an unconventional or obscure
form of state property, the task can present considerable challenges. An example
is the 2001 United States Court of Federal Claims decision in Tulare, an action in
inverse condemnation in which the unconventional property involved was water
rights under California law.5
As a species of property, California water rights are indeed both
unconventional and obscure. The interpretational challenge they present is
compounded by the complex physical and institutional context in which they
operate, of which the California Supreme Court wrote: "The scope and technical
complexity of issues concerning water resources management are unequaled by
virtually any other type of activity presented to the courts."6
But beyond their complexity and unconventionality, one factor in particular
contributes to the obscurity of California water rights as property: the ambiguity
that resides in the terms by which water rights are defined and in which they are
almost always discussed-water and use. The ambiguous usage of these terms is
common and usually innocuous; but in Tulare, it played a significant role in how
the case was decided.
In Tulare, the plaintiffs did not, themselves, hold title to the water rights they
claimed were infringed. Rather, they claimed to hold rights derived through their
water service contracts with the actual water right permit holder, the California

3. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); United States v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279
(1943); Rank v. Krug, 90 F. Supp. 773, 786 (1950).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. In addition, courts must apply the background principles of state law that may
further define the compensable expectations of property owners. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029. See generally
ROBERT MELTZ, DWIGHT

H. MERRIAM, & RICHARD M. FRANK,

THE TAKINGS ISSUE (1999).

5. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). Tulare, sometimes referred to as "Tulare I," decided the issue of takings
liability. The case had a second damages phase in which the court determined the compensation owed for the
taking. This phase of the case is reported as Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage District v. United States and is
often referred to as "Tulare H." 59 Fed. Cl. 246 (2003), modified on reh'g, 61 Fed. Cl. 624 (2004).
6. Envtl. Def. Fund v. E. Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 20 Cal. 3d 327, 344 (1977), vacated, 439 U.S. 811
(1978). Some states, like Colorado, have established a system of specialized "water courts." WELLS A.
HUTCHINS, 2 WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 452-54, 502 (1971). In California, state
courts may enlist the technical expertise of the State Water Resources Control Board through the court reference
procedures available under California Water Code sections 2000-2001 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007).
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Department of Water Resources (DWR). Implicit in this claim was the idea that
the water right consists of two, separate parts: a right to divert water from a
natural watercourse-a part that DWR itself continued to hold title to and to
exercise; and a right to make beneficial use of the water to be diverted by DWR,
a part of DWR's water right that the plaintiffs claimed had been transferred to
them.
But that idea is mistaken. The notion that a water right includes, as an
entitlement of the right itself, not only the right to divert water from a stream but
the further right to put the water taken from the stream to beneficial use is a
confusion that arises from the ambiguity that is created by the fact that those
most basic terms, water and use, each have different meanings with different
applications in California water law. In most contexts, the distinction between
their different meanings is unimportant and, thus, also is the failure to carefully
observe it. But under the facts in Tulare, the distinction was of key importance
and the failure to recognize it caused the court to fundamentally misapprehend
the nature of the water right as property under California law.7
A. The Tulare Case
1. The Takings Claim and the Court's Holding
Tulare was a suit in inverse condemnation brought in the United States Court
of Federal Claims by two California water agencies, the Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage District ("Tulare") and the Kern County Water Agency ("Kern"), and by
three entities that receive water from them: two public entities, Lost Hills Water
District and Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa Water Storage District; and a private
entity, Hansen Ranches. Kern and Tulare are large public districts organized
under California law that provide water for agricultural use in California's San
Joaquin Valley. In the early 1960s, the two districts entered into long-term water
service contracts with the DWR for water to be developed and delivered by the
State Water Project (SWP). DWR holds the water rights necessary for the
management and operation of the SWP.
The suit complained that federal regulation under the Endangered Species
Act (ESA) in the years 1992-1994 had restricted SWP diversions from the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta to protect the federally listed Delta smelt and
winter run salmon and thereby reduced SWP water deliveries to Kern and

7. Ironically, it is the very unimportance of the distinction in most contexts that has allowed the
ambiguity to become embedded in habits of language, making it all the more difficult to recognize in those rarer
contexts where the distinction is important. It seems, however, that those latter contexts may be becoming less
rare. Besides Tulare, there are two very recent cases in which the unexamined ambiguity in water and use has
had a material effect on the disposition of important issues before the court. One case is from Utah, Strawberry
Water Users Association v. United States, 133 P.3d 410 (2006); another is from California, State Water
Resources Control Board Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674 (2006). These cases are briefly discussed below. See
infra note 113.
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Tulare.! The plaintiffs claimed that the loss of this water constituted a Fifth
Amendment taking of property for which they were entitled to just compensation.
Addressing the merits of the taking claims on cross-motions for summary
judgment, the court agreed with the plaintiffs, finding that, by virtue of their
SWP contracts, the plaintiffs had held "water-use rights" in the quantities of
water lost to them because of the ESA restrictions on SWP operations. The court
found that these "water-use rights" were property derived from DWR's water
rights, and their loss on account of ESA regulation entitled the plaintiffs to
compensation.
DWR's water rights and its operation of the SWP played a central role in
Tulare. Just as the property basis for the takings claims of all the plaintiffs was
DWR's water rights for the SWP linked by the water supply contracts between
the two principal plaintiffs and DWR for the supply of water from the SWP, so
the essential fact common to all their claims was the curtailment of SWP
diversions that occurred as a result of federal regulation under the ESA.
2.

The Department of Water Resources and the State Water Project
a. Background

The State Water Project is the largest state-constructed water project in the
nation and one of the largest water projects in the world. 9 It is owned and
operated by the California Department of Water Resources, a state agency that
has contracts with twenty-nine public agencies to supply water for urban and
agricultural uses in the San Francisco Bay Area, the Central Coast, Southern
California, and the Sacramento and San Joaquin Valleys. DWR planned,
designed, and built the SWP's pumps, dams, canals and other water and power
facilities, which DWR now owns, operates, and maintains.' ° Among the many

8. The diversion restrictions resulted both from direct limitations on pumping and also from other
regulatory requirements, such as Delta outflow requirements, that resulted in less water available for export.
Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 316.
9. The Project consists of 28 dams and reservoirs, 26 pumping and generating plants, and some 660
miles of aqueducts. Its chief facilities are the Oroville Dam and Reservoir on the Feather River, the Harvey 0.
Banks Pumping Plant in the southern Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta ("Delta"), and the California Aqueduct,
stretching 400 miles from the Delta, south through the San Joaquin Valley and the gigantic lifts over the
Tehachapi Mountains, to terminal reservoirs in Southern California. The SWP provides an important
supplemental water supply for hundreds of thousands of acres in agricultural production in California's Central
Valley and for the municipal and industrial needs of two-thirds of the population of the state, some twenty-three
million people. DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 132-02: OPERATION OF THE STATE WATER
PROJECT at xxix, 3 (2004) [hereinafter BULLETIN 132-03]. Bulletin 132 is a series of reports published
periodically by DWR that updates information on the SWP.
In 2001, the SWP was recognized by the American Society of Civil Engineers as a "Civil Engineering
Monument of the Millennium," at that time one of only twenty American engineering achievements ever so
honored, sharing an exclusive company with the Golden Gate Bridge as California's only two recipients of the
award. SWP Civil Engineering:Monument of the Millennium, DWR PEOPLE, Summer 2001 at 12.
10. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 120, 123. Construction and financing of the SWP through state general
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engineering, administrative, governmental, financial, and legal responsibilities it
has as owner and operator of the SWP, DWR has obtained and holds and defends
in its name the water rights necessary for the operation of the SWP, including
water rights to divert water from the Feather River and from the Sacramento-San
Joaquin River Delta." Under these rights, the SWP stores water, primarily in
Oroville Reservoir on the Feather River, which is a tributary to the Sacramento
River, and then diverts both Oroville storage releases and unregulated flows'2
downstream
at its Banks Pumping Plant in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River
3
Delta. '
In the early 1960s, with the major SWP facilities under construction, DWR
entered into long term water supply contracts with public water agencies for
water to be developed and delivered by the SWP. The central provisions of all of
these contracts, including Kern's and Tulare's, are the same. 14 DWR made its
first SWP deliveries to Kern and Tulare in 1968, pumping water from the
southern Delta and transporting it via the California Aqueduct to aqueduct
turnouts within the Kern and Tulare service areas.

obligation bonds were approved in 1960 after a statewide referendum ratified the 1959 Burns-Porter Act, which
incorporated by reference the various organic authorities of the earlier 1933 State Central Valley Project Act.
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 160-93: THE CALIFORNIA WATER PLAN UPDATE (1994); State
Water Project Milestones, http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/swp/milestones.cfm (last visited Apr. 10,
2007) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The 1933 Act was the original state water development plan.
Because of depression-era financing difficulties, the Central Valley Project (CVP) ended up being constructed
and operated as a federal project by the United States Bureau of Reclamation. MARY MONTGOMERY & MARION
CLAWSEN, HISTORY OF LEGISLATION AND POLICY FORMATION OF THE CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT (1946). The
powers and authority of the Water Project Authority created by the 1933 Act were among those conferred upon
DWR when it was created in 1956. See 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 1932, § 261, at 3406.
11. See In re Implementation of Water Quality Objectives for the Central Valley Project, S.W.R.C.B.
No. 1641 (Dec. 29, 1999) [hereinafter "SWRCB 1999 DECISION"]; see also BULLETIN 132-03, supranote 9.
12. "Unregulated flow" refers to all flow other than SWP (and CVP) storage releases (i.e., natural flow,
abandoned return flow from upstream use, and abandoned non-SWP/CVP reservoir releases), which are all
legally subject to appropriation. See BULLETIN 132-03, supra note 9; In re Water Right Permits in the
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Watershed, S.W.R.C.B. No. 1594 (Nov. 17, 1983).
13.
BULLETIN 132-03, supra note 9. Stored water is released from Oroville Reservoir and flows
downstream to the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta where the SWP export facilities are located. On the way, it
supplies SWP contractors and water fights settlement contractors along the Feather River and in the Delta. In
the Delta, DWR diverts both the storage releases as well as any unregulated flow that is available and for which
it has capacity and demand either at the Banks Pumping Plant in the southern Delta or at the intake to the
SWP's North Bay Aqueduct in the northern Delta. Most of the water the SWP diverts from the Delta is taken at
the Banks Pumping Plant and is sent either to San Francisco Bay area contractors via the South Bay Aqueduct
or to contractors in the San Joaquin Valley, the Central Coast region, and Southern California via the 400-mile
California Aqueduct.
14. The SWP contracts were drafted in accordance with "Contracting Principles for Water Service
Contracts Under the California Water Resources Development System" announced by Governor Edmund G.
"Pat" Brown on January 20, 1960, reviewed by the Legislature, and published by DWR in June of 1960.
DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN 141: THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT WATER
SUPPLY CONTRACTS (1995) [hereinafter BULLETIN 141]. The first SWP water supply contract was entered into
with the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD) on November 4, 1960, and it was approved
in a mandamus proceeding in Metropolitan Water District of Southern Californiav. Marquardt,59 Cal. 2d 159
(1963). After four more contracts were executed on the MWD model, the Director of DWR adopted a set of
"Standard Provisions" to be incorporated into the subsequent contracts (including Kern's and Tulare's),
consisting of the first forty-four contract articles. See supra BULLETIN 141.
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b.

ESA Regulation of the State Water Project

Over the years, the activities of the SWP-and in particular its Delta
operations-have been regulated primarily by the State Water Resources Control
Board ("Board").'" The Board is the state agency that administers the state's
appropriative water rights system and from which DWR acquired its water right
permits for the SWP.16 In the early 1990s, DWR's diversions from the Delta also
came under regulation by two federal agencies, the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS-now known as "NOAA Fisheries") and the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service (USFWS), to protect two species of fish listed under the
ESA.17 The ESA restrictions at times caused a decrease in SWP water deliveries,
of deliveries that
including deliveries to plaintiffs Kern and Tulare, from the level
8
would have been made in the absence of the ESA regulation.1

15. See SWRCB 1999 DECISION, supra note 11.
16. The Board is responsible not only for issuing water right permits and thereby creating the initial
property in water, but also for exercising a broad public interest regulatory authority over its water right
permittees. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1250-1259 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007); see also United States v. State Water

Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 82 (1986); Temescal Water Co. v. Dep't of Pub. Works, 44 Cal. 2d 90
(1955); David B. Anderson, Recent Developments in Delta Decision Making, in WATER LAW: TRENDS,
POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, ENERGY, AND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 285 (1995).

17. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 315-16 (2001). The two
species were the delta smelt and the winter run of Central Valley chinook salmon. Id.
The Federal Endangered Species Act (ESA) is codified beginning at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1531. The ESA's
chief regulatory vehicle when a federal action is involved is the "biological opinion," issued pursuant to a
"Section 7 consultation" (section 7 of the ESA is codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536) between the federal action
agency and either the NMFS in the Department of Commerce (as in the case of the anadromous winter run
Chinook salmon) or the USFWS in the Department of Interior (as in the case of the Delta smelt). If the
biological opinion finds that the federal agency action would cause jeopardy to the species, it must set forth any
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" to the proposed project that would avoid jeopardy. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1536.
The reasonable and prudent alternatives operate effectively as regulatory terms and conditions on the proposed
action.
The federal action subject to regulation in the background of the Tulare case was the operation of the
federal CVP during 1992 to 1994, which included the coordinated Delta operations of the SWP. The CVP,
operated by the United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR), also stores water upstream on the Sacramento
system and, like the SWP, diverts substantial amounts of water from the Delta. The USBR also owns and
operates the Delta Cross Channel facility, which can direct flow from the Sacramento River into the central
Delta to avoid water quality degradation from the lower estuary. The reasonable and prudent alternatives the
ESA specified for CVP and SWP operations in the Delta included direct limitations on project diversions and
limitations on use of the Delta Cross Channel, which indirectly decreased the ability of the projects to divert
water.
18. The court found that Kern and Tulare's 1992 to 1994 SWP water deliveries (which DWR Bulletin 132-95
shows to have been an aggregate of 2.542 million acre-feet of water) were 297 thousand acre-feet of water less than
they would have been in the absence of the ESA regulation of DWR's Delta diversions. See Tulare Lake Basin Water
Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 317 (2001); DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, BULLETIN
132-95: THE CALIFORNIA STATE WATER PROJECT WATER SUPPLY CONTRACTS 261, tbl. B-5B (1995)

[hereinafter BULLETIN 132-95].
At the time, regulation in the Bay-Delta estuary under the ESA and state law (in particular, the SWRCB's
mammoth Bay-Delta planning and regulatory effort, begun in 1987) raised the issue of what restrictions on the Delta
operations of the SWP and CVP were reasonable and adequately supported by the evidence. The complex relationships
among estuarine biology, Delta hydrodynamics, water project operations, and the impact of non-project factors was not
well understood, and an important controversy existed as to what type and degree of regulation of the operations of the
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3.

The "Water-Use Right"

The Tulare court found that the ESA regulations that constrained SWP

operations and resulted in a decrease in SWP deliveries constituted a taking of
the plaintiffs' rights to use water they would otherwise have received from the
SWP under their contracts with DWR. The court referred to these rights as the
plaintiffs' "water-use rights" and declared them to be derived from DWR's water
rights. '9 The court specifically found that, in depriving the plaintiffs of all use of

the specific quantity of water not delivered, the impact of the federal restrictions
amounted to an "exclusive occupation" and a "physical taking" of the plaintiffs'

water-use rights to that water and thus constituted a per se taking of their
property.20 The court rejected the government's argument that the facts at most
merited analysis as a "regulatory taking,"2 '
The court also rejected the United States' primary argument that the plaintiffs
had no property rights, that their water supply contracts with DWR gave them
nothing more than non-compensable contractual expectations whose frustration
due to lawful ESA regulation fell under the rule in Omnia Commercial Co. v.
United States.22 Instead, the court found that the plaintiffs themselves held
property rights under California law. Its view was that the plaintiffs' "water-use
rights" are property rights that devolve from the state by permit and then by
contract to end users of water: "[W]hile under California law the title to water
always remains with the state, the right to the water's use is transferred first by
permit, and then by contract to end-users such as the plaintiffs. 23
SWP and CVP was warranted by the evidence that did exist. See Anderson, supra note 16, at 286-90. The sufficiency
of the factual basis for the regulation was therefore an important issue, ultimately one with constitutional implications
of its own (due process), but a far different issue than the constitutional issue in Tulare (takings). If a regulatory effort is
questionable because of the uncertain state of the evidence supporting it, the remedy is in mandamus to set aside the
regulation, not in damages for condemnation. MELTZ, Er AL., supra note 4, at 473-81.
19. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 318. "Water-use right" is a term unknown in California law.
20. Id. at 319-20.
21. Id Where the alleged taking is found to be a "physical taking," i.e., the physical occupation or invasion of
property, liability is automatic. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982). Where the
alleged taking involves a regulation unduly restricting the use of property, a balancing must be done that considers the
character of the government regulation and the impact on the property owners' reasonable, investment-backed
expectations and opportunity for use. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978). All
property is otherwise held subject to noncompensable regulation under the state's police power. Peabody v. Vallejo, 2
Cal. 2d 251 (1935); Gray v. Reclamation Dist. 1600, 174 Cal. 622 (1917); see also infra note 51.
22. 261 U.S. 502 (1923). In Onmia, the Supreme Court held that frustration of a mere contractual expectancy
by lawful government action did not constitute a Fifth Amendment taking. In that case, the United States requisitioned
a certain steel producer's entire output of steel, to the detriment of a party who had a contract with that producer for a
supply of steel. In finding no taking of the contractor's rights, the Supreme Court reasoned that the contract did not pass
title from the producer to the contractor in the undelivered steel, so the contractor was not deprived of any property
rights by the federal requisition. The court in Tulare distinguished Omnia by finding that the plaintiffs' contracts
constituted not just a contractual expectancy to be supplied water to which they had no title, but the actual conferral of
property interests in specific quantities of water. See Tulare, 49 Fed. C1. at 317.
23. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 318 (citations omitted). One can observe in this brief but important statement
by the court explaining the origin and devolution of "water-use rights" the difficulty it encountered in making
its way through the complexities of California water law and institutions. There is virtually no part of this key
statement that is correct:
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Although this passage refers to transfer by contract as the general mechanism
by which "water-use rights" are acquired, the court did not identify any provision
for transfer, grant, or conveyance of water rights in the plaintiffs' water service
contracts with DWR. Nor, in finding that the plaintiffs' rights were "derivative of
the permit issued to DWR,' 24 did the court's opinion address the point that DWR
had no permits and no water rights when the contracts were executed in 1963the water right permits for the SWP having not been granted to DWR until
1967.5

1. "end-users such as plaintiffs": None of the public agency plaintiffs, who represented most of the alleged
losses, were "end-users" of water; rather, they were themselves water purveyors like DWR.
2. "'transferred...by contract to end-users": The rights that most end users of water in California have to
the water they receive are not contract rights at all, but rather common law and statutory rights of service from
local districts and public utilities, including rights to public service. See HAROLD E. ROGERS & ALAN H.
NICHOLS, 1 WATER FOR CALIFORNIA 433-51 (1967).
3. "title always remains with the state": As to water in watercourses, the idea that the state or the people
hold a proprietary title to running water, as implied in Water Code section 102 (cited by the court), was
expressly and pointedly rejected by the California Supreme Court ninety years ago in Palmer v. Railroad
Commission, 167 Cal. 163 (1914), a rejection thoroughly and insightfully reviewed and reaffirmed by the court
of appeal in the recent case of California v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1019 (2000).
Tulare cited neither case.
As to water removed from its natural source and reduced to possession, the proposition is equally
untenable. First, the state cannot "retain" a title it never had in the first place. Second, while proprietary title can
and does exist in water that has been diverted and reduced to possession, it is difficult to conceive of either the
nature or the effect of the title the state might be thought to retain to water in the rightful possession of others:
for example, in a bottled beverage on a store shelf, in a stalk of celery, or in drawn bath water-not to speak of
the sixty-seven percent of the average human body that is water. There is no instance that comes to mind in
which the state has asserted title to water against the otherwise rightful possession of another. To the contrary,
in Riverside, the court said, "[t]he State's 'ownership' under Water Code section 102 confers no power of
possession or use upon it." Id. at 1028. Public "ownership" that does not preclude or limit the assertion of
private ownership and that includes neither a present nor a future right of possession or use is frankly a word
with no substantive meaning.
4. "right is transferred.., by permit": The SWRCB does not "transfer" or purport to transfer water rights
to its permittees when it grants a permit or license (any more than the Department of Motor Vehicles, for
example, transfers its right to drive when it issues a driver's license), but rather it creates and confers them by
governmental fiat in approving applications to appropriate under Division 2 of the Water Code. See CAL.
WATER CODE §§ 1200-1851 (West 1971 & Supp. 2007) (detailing the administrative process for applying for
and obtaining appropriative water right permits and licenses). In addition, Water Code section 1050 specifically
states: "the board ... shall be regarded as performing a governmental function in carrying out the provisions of
this division [Division 2]." CAL. WATER CODE § 1050 (emphasis added).
5. "transferredby contract to... plaintiffs": DWR did not receive its water rights from the SWRCB until
1967, several years after it entered into the water supply contracts with plaintiffs Kern and Tulare. See infra text
accompanying notes 24 and 25.
24. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 318 n.6.
25. See Contract Between the State of California Department of Water Resources and Kern County
Water Agency, For a Supply of Water, Nov. 15, 1963, published in BULLETIN 141, supra note 14 [hereinafter
Kern Contract]; Contract Between the State of California Department of Water Resources and Tulare Lake
Basin Water Storage, District For a Supply of Water, Dec. 20, 1963, published in BULLETIN 141, supra note
14 [hereinafter Tulare Contract]; and In re Application 5629, S.W.R.C.B. No. 1275 (May 31, 1967).
Water rights are mentioned in the water supply contracts only in the brief reference in Article 16(b) to
DWR's obligation to exercise good-faith efforts to obtain water rights for the yet-to-be-constructed project.
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In fact, in holding the contracts with DWR to have effected a transferof right
to the plaintiffs (i.e., a transfer of the so-called "water-use right"), the court did
not cite or discuss any provision of the SWP water supply contracts, but instead
looked to the state's substantive law of water rights. Although the court did not
elaborate much on the matter, its reasoning seems clearly enough to have been
that, if DWR's water rights--once they acquired them-include not only the
right to divert water but also the right to make beneficial use of the water it
diverts (the unarticulated major premise in the court's reasoning), and, if it is
those in the SWP contractors' service areas who beneficially use the water DWR
diverts rather than DWR itself, then the effect of the water supply contracts was
to transfer to 2the
plaintiffs DWR's water right to make beneficial use of the
6
diverted water.

B. The PropertyIssue Raised by the Court'sDecision on Liability
1. The Substantive Issue
However the court may have understood the transfer of interest in DWR's
rights to the plaintiffs to have occurred did not change the threshold property
issue in the case: What rights did DWR actually hold under its water rights? For
the plaintiffs to have been transferred any property rights by DWR, or to

I

"The State shall make all reasonable efforts to perfect and protect water fights necessary for [the State Water
Resources Development System, defined in Article l(b)] and for the satisfaction of water supply commitments
under this contract." BULLETIN 141, supra note 14. Article 6(c) refers in similar fashion to DWR's obligation to
exercise good faith efforts to complete the facilities necessary for the SWP to store, divert, and transport water
for timely delivery. Id. at 21.
In fact, the Bums-Porter Act and the "Governor's Contracting Principles" indicate no more than an intent
to create a simple contractual relationship between DWR and the local agencies for the supply of statedeveloped water through state-owned and state-operated facilities on an unsubsidized basis-that is, on an
equitable contract pricing basis designed to fairly recover all construction costs and operation and maintenance
costs of the Project allocated to its water supply function in accordance with express state policy and with sound
business practices.
26. Because of the very ambiguities under discussion in this article, it is important to be clear that the
court was speaking of the use of diverted water-beneficial use-as the specific entitlement transferred to, held
by, and taken from the plaintiffs. The court called that entitlement the "water-use right," the right held by the
plaintiffs as "end-users of water," i.e., those who actually put water to beneficial use. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 317.
But, the court also made an odd reference at two points in the opinion to plaintiffs' right to "withdraw or
use water" and to "plaintiffs' right to divert water." Id. at 315, 324 (emphasis added). These anomalous
references to diversion are puzzling, no less so because the court expressly distinguished DWR's right to
appropriate (i.e., divert) from the plaintiffs' right to use water: "We further acknowledge that plaintiffs possess
rights not as direct appropriatorsof water but as parties to a contract with an entity-DWR--entitled to
appropriate water." Id. at 318 n.6 (emphasis added); see infra note 28. The two passing references to diversion
are never elaborated upon in the decision or relied on by the court. Moreover, they are completely at odds with
the scheme of the water service contracts, under which DWR stores, diverts, and conveys water to the SWP
contractors, and with the practical reality that it is DWR, not the plaintiffs, that owns and operates the SWP
diversion facilities in the Delta necessary to exercise the right of diversion.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
otherwise claim rights through DWR, DWR had to have first held those rights
itself. One cannot transfer a right one does not have.27
Although the court did not explain the nature of the property rights held by
DWR any more than it explained how the plaintiffs actually acquired interests in
that property, the court was clear in its view that DWR's water rights were the
source and basis of the plaintiffs' "water-use rights."28 The purpose of this article
is to examine this proposition in detail. Specifically, the question this article will
explore-and answer-is: Does the California water right-specifically, the
appropriative water right held by DWR-include the right to the post-diversion
beneficial use of water, the so-called "water-use right" that the court found the
plaintiffs to have held by virtue of their contractual relationship with DWR?
This question has obvious significance for the Tulare decision. The
proposition it explores is at the heart of the court's determination of liability. If
the water rights held by DWR did not include that right, then no contract made
by DWR with the plaintiffs could have conveyed such a right. In that case, not
only would the court's reason for finding a taking per se disappear, but also its
proffered basis for distinguishing Omnia and for finding a taking at all.29
2.

The InterpretationalIssue

Although water rights are an unusual form of property, the truth is they are
not that unusual. In fact, they are very similar in nature to other familiar and well
understood common law property rights, namely, easements, profits A prendre,
and hunting and fishing rights. Moreover, they are virtually identical in nature to
oil and gas rights, a common and much-examined instance of the profit Aprendre
in California. 0 The major impediment to understanding the nature of water rights
as property is, rather, the ambiguity that exists in the very terms by which they

27. It is a fundamental precept of the law that one cannot convey a title superior to the title one holds. It
is expressed in the common law maxim, nemo plus juris transferrepotest quam ipse habet, or, more simply,
nemo dat quod non habet: you can't give what you don't have. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1736 (8th ed. 2004).
28. The court stated:
We accept that plaintiffs' contract rights are derivative of the permit issued to D"
.... We further
acknowledge that plaintiffs possess rights not as direct appropriators of water but as parties to a
contract with an entity-DWR--entitled to appropriate water. Those observations, however, do not
change our conclusion that plaintiffs' right to the use of water is a compensable contractual
right ....
Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 318 n.6. Whether, in the end, the plaintiffs' asserted rights are to be understood as
contractual rights, as property rights conveyed to them by DWR, or as property rights transferred to them by
operation of law, the source of their rights was DWR's water rights; and the validity of their asserted rights
necessarily turned on DWR's originally holding a property right to make beneficial use of water.
29. If the contract had not caused a property title to pass, then, under Omnia, the federal action would
have constituted nothing more than the uncompensable frustration of a contractual expectancy-and not a
taking. See supra note 22.
30. These basic similarities are examined later in Part III.
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are defined, water and use,3 and the habits of language in which that ambiguity
has over time become entrenched.32
The two essential aspects of all property are (1) the thing or resource that is
the subject matter of the property and (2) the ability or activity that the right
entitles or protects with respect to that thing or resource.33 For water rights, these
two essential aspects of property are often expressed in phrases such as "the right
to use water," which employ those very, ambiguous terms: the subject matter,
water, and the ability or entitlement, use. Thus, in looking at the doctrinal
characteristics of water rights as property, particular attention must be paid to the
ambiguity in those key terms and to the influence the ambiguity had upon the
court's interpretation of California water rights law.
II. WATER RIGHTS: PROPERTY IN "WATER"
The title of this Part, "Water Rights: Property in 'Water,"' is ambiguousand deliberately so. It uses and highlights the word "water" to draw attention at
the very outset to the fact that "water," as commonly used in reference to water
rights-and even within the term "water right" itself-is ambiguous. The fact is,
there are many different forms of water and different kinds of rights in them; and
in some forms, there are no rights at all.
For example, there is the rainwater that collects in puddles in one's yard or
on one's fields, which the law calls "diffused surface water. 34 There is water that
has escaped from a watercourse and is roaming destructively over the land,
which the law calls "vagrant flood waters." 35 There is the water flowing in a ditch
or a pipe, conducting it to a field, a factory, or a house, which may be either
realty or personalty.36 There is spring water that arises and remains on one's land.
There is water held in a water tower or cistern, or standing in furrows in an
irrigated field. There is the glass of water, drawn and waiting to be drunk. None

31. These are also the terms used in the expression "water-use right."
32. A closely-related habit that has without doubt helped not only to perpetuate this ambiguity but
actually to shield it from useful insight is the frequent recourse of legal writers to describing water rights as
"usufructs" or as being "usufructuary." "Usufruct" is a term imported from the European and ancient Roman
civil law. In continental Europe, it became an important and well-developed construct of its property law,
different from common law property traditions rooted in the later medieval institution of estates in land. But, as
a solitary, transplanted term, shorn of its defining civil law context and having none in the common law, its
chief contribution to the English and American law of water rights seems to be (1)that it sounds like and refers
in some manner to "use" ("use"-ufruct), (2) that it has an erudite, vaguely Latin, and thus authoritative ring to
it, and (3), that it ends rather than prompts or informs thoughtful analysis. The usufruct is discussed more
thoroughly below.
33. "Property under the law consists of specific rights in relation to particular things. The things
themselves are not property in the legal sense; they are merely the objects [subject matters] of property."
Theodore E.Lauer, The RiparianRight as Property,in WATER RESOURCES AND THE LAW 152 (1958).
34. Mogle v. Moore, 16 Cal. 2d 1, 8-9 (1940).
35. Id. at 9.
36. Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman, 152 Cal. 716, 725-30 (1908).
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of these is the "water"-the "property" 37 -to which a water right attaches. One
may drain, dike, levee, apply, irrigate, circulate, discharge, flush, or drink this
water and not be exercising, or in need of, a water right.38
The water of "water rights" is, specifically, running water. Water rights are
property rights in natural watercourses, not in the water they contain or in the
water taken from them.39 This point, the distinction between water as a substance
and the watercourse as the phenomenon of flowing water, '" is essential to
understanding the nature of the water right as property and to the analysis of the
41
decision in the Tulare case.
A.

The Originsof Property in Running Water
1. The Physical Characterof Running Water

Water rights do not, as a species of property, fall within our normal sense and
everyday understanding about property in land and chattels. 42 The reason is
obvious, and it inheres in the very nature of water as it exists in nature. Unlike
land and structures, water in natural watercourses43 is neither static nor welldefined." It moves and it changes. "One cannot step into the same stream twice"
is the famous maxim from antiquity, 5 and it succinctly conveys the central
problem for recognizing property in running water. "Running water at one

37. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing the different meanings of the word "property").
38. See ROGERS & NICHOLS, supra note 23, 186-89.
39. The passage from Wiel quoted at the beginning of this article provides the key perspective: "The law
of watercourses is a law of streams as natural resources." See WIEL, supra note 1, at 1 (emphasis added).
Regarding lakes and percolating groundwater basins, which are also natural water resources subject to water
rights, see infra note 55.
40. With phrases such as "running water" or "flowing water," there is a tendency at times to think of
water as the "thing" and running orflowing as merely an unfixed attribute or transient state of that thing whose
presence or absence does not change its essential nature. While that may be true in other contexts, it is not true
for property in watercourses, because the fact that water is running and not static goes to its essential nature as
the subject matter of property. As the subject matter of property, the phenomenon of running water is itself the
"thing" as if the expression were runningwater.
41. The shorthand use of "water" to refer to running water is a common economy of speech. It is used as
such throughout the California Water Code. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 1202. (West 1971) (using "water"
in a context in which "running water" is clearly meant). The shorthand is harmless so long as it is not used in a
context where it is important to distinguish between running water and other forms of water.
42. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 182 (1977) ("Because the physical nature of water differs
from that of land and disputes concerning water often take a different form from those involving land, the
general rules of real property law may not be suitable for direct application to water cases.").
43. The California Water Code refers to natural watercourses as water flowing in natural channels. CAL.
WATER CODE § 1201.

Staff Paper No. 6, in GOVERNOR'S
7 (1978).
45. "You could not step twice into the same rivers, for other waters are ever flowing on to you." JOHN
BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 62 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed. 1992) (attributing the phrase to Greek
philosopher Heraclitus).
44.
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instance is at one place in the river, then it is gone and some other water has
succeeded it, without anyone having been able to tag it as his own; a thing in
continual motion and ceaseless change, incapable of possession or ownership in
that condition. 46
As a subject of property, flowing water ill-fits property's foundational concept
of possession and defies the very order and predictability that it is property's
purpose to provide. 47 "Watercourses are not at all similar to other objects of
property, which consist of substance which remains, for virtually all purposes,
constant.... The inherent instability of flowing water has made it difficult to
predicate a firm system of legal rights. 48
In short, running water has a unique physical character and, over time, the
unique physical character of running water has dictated its unique legal character
as a subject matter of property.49

46. Samuel C. Wiel, Origin and ComparativeDevelopment of the Law of Watercourses in the Common
Law and Civil Law, 6 CAL. L. REV. 245, 254 (1918).
47. Possession is the foundational concept of common law property. Ownership--of "things" as
opposed to the ownership of "interests"-is not substantively well-defined in the common law, but is probably
best defined as the "right to possession." By contrast, and relevant to the discussion of usufructs, infra,
"ownership" is the comerstone of property in the civil law of continental Europe and is well-defined therein.
See OLIN L. BROWDER JR., ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 73, 77-78 (3d ed. 1975); 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROP.,
§§ 10, 19-26 (1936). Possession requires control of a subject matter such as to yield the ability to use and enjoy
it and to exclude others from it. See id. at 73; OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 170-72, 193
(1963). That degree of control is impossible for naturally flowing waters.
The key feature of flowing water that makes possession so problematic is, of course, that itflows; that,
from a fixed point of reference (whether the point of diversion or the place of use), its substance is constantly
changing. But besides that, the flow of water itself can also vary, from year to year, from season to season, and
even from day to day. In addition to their visible surface flow, watercourses may have unseen subsurface flow
as well and can be interconnected with groundwater that may increase or decrease stream flow. Seepage and
evaporation may deplete their flow, and precipitation and runoff may augment it-at different times and at
different places along their length.
48. Lauer, supra note 33, at 160.
49. Fish and other animals in the wild (ferae naturae) are not susceptible of physical possession, either.
Because of that physical insusceptibility, they too are incapable of legal possession and, hence, ownership. In
his lecture on "Possession" in The Common Law, Justice Holmes used the example of wildlife in a rhetorical
illustration of the necessary connection of physical facts to legal principles:
Every right is a consequence attached by the law to one or more facts which the law defines ....
When a group of facts thus singled out by the law exists in the case of a given person, he is said to be
entitled to the corresponding rights ... . The word 'possession' denotes such a group of facts ....
To gain possession, then, a man must stand in a certain physical relation to the object... there must
be a certain degree of power over the object. If there were only one other man in the world, and he
were safe under lock and key in jail, the person having the key would not possess the swallows that
flew over the prison.
HOLMES, supra note 47, at 170-71, 181, 193; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (Holmes,
J.). Holmes might as easily have said that the jailor would not possess the water flowing in the stream next to
the prison either. Case law applies the same descriptive phrases interchangeably to running water and to animals
in the wild to underscore the central fact that these resources are incapable of possession and ownership. Thus,
running water has been called a "mineral ferae naturae." Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 204 (1900);
California v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1019, 1032 (2000); Ex ParteElam, 6 Cal. App. 233, 236 (1907).
The right to capture wild animals (fish) has been called "usufructuary," a term specifically used to denote the
nonpossessory character of water rights. See, e.g., Alegretti & Co. v. County of Imperial, 138 Cal. App. 4th
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2.

The Negative Community of Interest in Running Water: Propertyin No
One

The idea of property in running water has always been an elusive one,
beginning with Roman law and continuing on into the civil law of continental
Europe and the common law of England. Roman law did not distinguish among
the many forms of fresh water in nature: clouds, rain, diffused surface water,
stream flow, river underflow, percolating groundwater, vapor, lakes, flood water,
seepage, etc. Because of the fugitive and fluctuating character of water in its
natural state, Roman law denied the existence of property in water altogetherincluding running water-and held the use of rivers and lakes to be the common
right of everyone, like the sea and the air. 0
Wiel embraced the description favored by the civil law commentator Pothier
of this common right as a "negative community of interest": running water
belonged to no one; everyone who had access to the resource had a right to take
from it. Unlike property ownership, whose distinctive features are possession,
control, and the right to exclude others, the implicit feature of the public right to
running water, being incapable of possession or ownership, was the right not to
be obstructed from using it.' It was, rather, more like the public right the law
recognizes today to use a public street or highway or to use a navigable
waterway, vindicable not by an individual claiming under private right but by the
public prosecutor complaining under the law of public nuisance." The "negative
community of interest," as its name implies, was the very antithesis of property 3

1261, 1271 (2006); Wisconsin v. Matthews, 635 N.W.2d 601,603 (Wisc. 2003).
50. WIEL, supra note 1, at 748-49, 955-57; cf Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 315 (1886).
51. "This civil-law principle that running water is in the 'negative community' passed into the common
law. It was taken up by the mediaeval English law-writers." WIEL, supra note 1, at 4. The United States
Supreme Court in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1896), quoted Pothier at length on his
characterization of the "negative community" in regard to animalsferae naturae and four years later referred to
the "negative community" in Ohio Oil v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 208-09 (1900), in reference to oil and gas.
The "civil law" refers to the Roman law set down in the sixth century under the Emperor Justinian in the
Corpus Juris Civilis, adapted throughout Europe during the Middle Ages, and forming the basis of much of
modem law on the European and South American continents. The civil law was codified under Napoleon I and
is known as the Civil Code or the Code Napol6on, and its adoption followed Napoleon's conquests into the
other countries of Western Europe and their colonies. BROWDER ET AL., supra note 47; WILL DURANT & ARIEL
DURANT, THE AGE OF NAPOLEON 180-82, 219-24, 590. (1975); Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of Roman
Law-I, 12 CAL. L. REV. 393, 395-96 (1923-1924).
52. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3479, 3480 (West 1997).
53. Wiel provides a quote from Robert Callis, a common law commentator from the seventeenth
century, that conveys the pervasive sense of the time of the intuitive impossibility of ownership of running
water:
But that there should be a property fixed in running waters, I cannot be drawn to that opinion.... [lit
should be strange the law of property should be fixed upon such uncertainties as to be altered into
meum, tuum, suum, before these words can be spoken, and to be changed in every twinkling of an
eye, and to be more uncertain in the proprietor than a chameleon of his colours.
WIEL, supra, note 1, at 5-6 (quoting ROBERT CALLIS, UPON THE STATUTE OF SEWERS 78 (1622)) (noting that
"sewers" at that time meant small streams). Wiel finds this view echoed by Blackstone and by the English cases
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Wiel began his seminal treatise on water rights by noting that there are two
categories of fresh water in its natural state: one in which there is simply too little
physical definition to support systematic exploitation or a practical system of
property, like clouds, rain, diffuse surface waters, and vagrant flood waters; and
one in which water, albeit in flux, is nonetheless sufficiently physically confined
to support a limited institution of property. In this latter group are streams
(confined by beds and banks), lakes (confined by a shoreline), and percolating
groundwater (confined by the geomorphology of the aquifer)." Streams and lakes
are categorized together under the heading of "watercourse."55
It is this latter category that contains the naturally occurring forms of water
that are, today, the "res" of the water right, the "thing" to which the limited right
of property attaches.56 To emphasize the point made at the beginning of this
section, the res, or subject matter, of the water right as property is not water as a
substance, 7 it is the watercourse: water in its natural, moving state-aqua
profluens in the Latin of the common law-running water. As it pertains to
surface water, water rights law is the law of watercourses.

from the early 1800s and in Mason v. Hill, 5 Barn. & Adol. 1 (1833): "No one has any property in the water
itself except in the particular portion which he might have abstracted from the stream and of which he had the
possession, and during the time of such possession only." Id. at 7.
54. WIEL,supra note 1, 1-4. Weil chose to include percolating groundwater in the class of "indefinite"
waters, reflecting perhaps what was at the time a less certain understanding of the behavior of water under the
ground.
55. In California water rights law, "watercourse" includes all forms of surface waters interconnected
with streams, including springs, lakes, and ponds. Duckworth v. Watsonville Light & Power Co., 150 Cal. 520,
528 (1907); Guitierrez v. Wege, 145 Cal. 730, 734 (1905). For economy, percolating groundwater-the other
natural form of water in which water rights are recognized-is not included in the discussion here and does not
need to be. It is sufficient to note that the general, nonpossessory, non-ownership characteristics of property in
watercourses have also come to apply to percolating groundwater as well. Moreover, the riparian and
appropriative right doctrines for surface water have been given analogous applications in overlying and nonoverlying groundwater rights. See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116 (1902).
56. The Restatement of Property defines "property" in the manner set forth by Professor Hohfeld in
1913, as a set of correlative legal relationships among people (right/duty, privilege/no right, power/liability,
immunity/inability) with respect to a certain subject matter or thing. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. 3-9
(1936); Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). In other popular conventions, "property" is used to mean the subject matter or thing
itself (as in, "that car is my property"). This article recognizes the preference for the Restatement form; but, for
emphasis, it will speak of the "res" or thing to which a property right "attaches," meaning the subject matter of
the property right. The purpose in this is to focus on and emphasize what the proper subject matter of the water
right is-and is not-given the persistent, ambiguous use of the term "water" and the significant confusion that
ambiguous use creates.
57. See WATER AND WATER RIGHTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS AND ALLIED PROBLEMS 67
(Robert Clark ed. 1967). "This nature of the property right in flowing water as only a right of use-a simple
usufruct-while it passed along became an established facet of the riparian doctrine." Id. (emphasis added).
Division 2 of the Water Code contains the provisions for the state's administrative conferral of appropriative
water right permits and licenses. Section 1001 provides: "Nothing in this division shall be construed as giving
or confirming any right, title, or interest to or in the corpus of any water." CAL. WATER CODE § 1001 (West
1971). This section makes the point explicitly that "water" is not the subject matter of the water right.
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3. Recognition of Water Rights and Property in Running Water
Wiel described how the common law ultimately came to recognize positive
rights in running water, not as a community of interest but as individual, albeit
correlative, rights in a common pool resource, a property inuring to those who
had access to it. What had previously been characterized as res nullius or res
communes, to denote a resource altogether incapable of property right, came to
be characterized as res publicae and publici juris, signaling the inherent public
character and residual public interest in the resource that accompanied the
recognition of a limited private property right in it.5"
The following is Wiel's own survey of the nineteenth century English courts'
early recognition of the water right, and it gives both the substance and the flavor
of what he called the law's evolved "attitude toward running water":

The beginning of the last century saw a re-examination into the nature of
rights in running water. In 1805, in Bealy v. Shaw, Lord Ellenborough
laid down the right, but without discussing the foundation of it. In 1823,
however, in Wright v. Howard, it was said of a stream, "there is no
property in the water." In 1824, in Williams v. Moreland, appear the

58. WIEL, supra, note 1, at 4-13. The most forceful expression of this residual public character is the
"public trust," which employs property terms like "trust," "easement," and "servitude" to describe the
dimension and importance of that public character. See Schneider, supra, note 44, at 10.
Property, being as Jeremy Bentham asserted, a creature of the law and impossible without it, does not
exist in a vacuum but in a legal and socio-political context that inherently defines and limits it. See Lauer, supra
note 33, at 151 (quoting JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (1871)). That defining context-as
particularly illustrated not only in the public trust cases (e.g., National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33
Cal. 3d 419 (1983)), but also in the cases discussing the scope of traditional police power regulation of water
diversions and use (e.g., Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351 (1935) and Joslin v. Marin Municipal Utility
District, 67 Cal. 2d 132 (1967))-is especially important for a resource as vital to biological existence, as
significant to society's social and economic needs, and as multifarious and interdependent in its uses and
benefits as water running in rivers and streams. In a famous passage, Justice Holmes referred to this legal and
socio-political context as a "neighborhood of principles of policy" and recognized the special public character
of flowing water that may be subject to private rights:
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in fact are limited
by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right
is founded .... The limits set to property by other public interests present themselves as a branch of
what is called the police power of the state.
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable, and independent of particular theory
than the interest of the public of a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly within it substantially
undiminished, except by such drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare may permit for
the purposes of turning them to a more perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent wherever
there is a state, and grows more pressing as population grows.. . . Whether it be said that such an
interest justifies the cutting down by statute, without compensation, in the exercise of the police
power, of what would otherwise be private rights of property, or that, apart from statute, those rights
do not go to the height of what the defendant seeks to do, the result is the same .... The private right
to appropriate is subject not only to the private rights of lower owners, but to the initial limitation
that it may not substantially diminish one of the great foundations of public welfare and health.
Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1908).
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expressions, "Flowing water is originally publici juris," and "running
water is not in its nature private property." In 1831, in Liggins v. Inge,
"Water flowing in a stream, it is well settled by the law of England, is
publici juris." In Mason v. Hill, decided in 1833, Lord Denman
elaborately considered the attitude of the law toward running water, with
the intention "to discuss, and so far as we are able, to settle the principle
upon which rights of this nature depend," and this case has been
generally accepted as accomplishing this result, settling the common law
of watercourses in its present form. Lord Denman quotes at length from
the civil law, and says concerning it: "No one had any property in the
water itself except in that particular portion which he might have
abstracted from the stream and of which he had the possession, and
during the time of such possession only," and says that the expressions of
Blackstone and the common-law cases just quoted calling running water
"publici juris," simply adopted into the common law this principle that
the water itself was not the subject of private ownership. This was
followed very explicitly in the succeeding English cases. In one it was
said: "Flowing water, as well as light and air, are in one sense 'publici
juris.' They are a boon from Providence to all and differ in their mode of
enjoyment. Light and air are diffused in all directions, flowing water in
some." In another: "The water which they claim a right to take [from a
spring] is not the produce of the plaintiff's close; it is not his property; it
is not the subject of property. Blackstone, following other elementary
writers, classes water with the elements of the light and air." And in the
classical case of Embrey v. Owen, this finds what may be called its
crystallized expression in the English reports. In this case Baron Parke
(who had also taken part in the judgment in Mason v. Hill) said:
"Flowing water is publici juris, not in the sense that it is bonum vacans,
to which the first occupant may acquire an exclusive right, but that it is
public and common in this sense only: that all may reasonably use it who
have a right of access to it; that none can have any property in the water
itself, except in the particular portion which he may choose to abstract
from the stream and take into his possession, and that during the time of
possession only." As late as the 1906 Appeal Cases the Chancellor said
that running water is "publici juris," and a claim to ownership of the
corpus of the water of a stream was said by another of the lords to be
"opposed to elementary ideas about the water of a river," and "repugnant
to the general law of rivers."59

What Wiel found the court in Embrey v. Owen "crystallizing" in the phrase,
"all may reasonably use it who have a right of access to it," was the emergent

59.

WIEL,

supra note 1, at 7-8 (citations omitted).

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
riparian doctrine and one of the earliest judicial articulations of what is now
called the "water right," the unique, limited property in running water recognized
in America today. 6° In its emphasis on access, it reflected a truth central to all
water rights: that the singular property recognized in natural sources of water is
not at all in the nature of a traditional, possessory estate in the physical resource.
It is not a question of title to the flowing water itself-an idea in fact strenuously
rejected in the cases and comments Wiel cites and quotes and in all cases since
then-but rather of opportunity to create a title in the substance of the water by
taking it from its natural source and reducing it to possession.6 ' As the riparian
doctrine flourished in the English and American common law, the middle of the
nineteenth century saw the appearance in American jurisprudence of the second
expression of this unique property in running water in the doctrine of prior
appropriation. For prior appropriation, the opportunity to create title in water
through possession was provided not by access, as in the case of riparian
ownership, but by appropriation itself.
B. Modern Water Rights
As Wiel declared in the passage introducing this article, water rights lawthe law of watercourses--consists of the rules by which one may go to a
watercourse and take of its waters. California recognizes two sets of rules that
provide and govern that opportunity to interact with running water as a natural
resource.

60. In his very thorough and excellent article, Lauer describes the two essential physical requirements of
the riparian right as the existence of a watercourse and a means of lawful access: "It is upon these two simple
but fundamental elements that the often-times seemingly elaborate structure of the riparian right is founded."
Lauer, supra note 33, at 175. The right conferred upon the riparian owner by access, i.e., by the natural
disposition of the land vis-A-vis the naturally flowing water, is called a right exjure naturae-theright to avail
oneself of the natural advantages of the location and circumstances of one's land. Wholey v. Caldwell, 108 Cal.
95, 100-01 (1895).
61. This article, like the early commentaries on water rights just quoted, contrasts the nonpossessory
water right to divert water from a watercourse, on the one hand, with the possession and ownership of the water
thus diverted and reduced to possession, on the other. It should be understood, of course, that the exercise of the
water right does not always result in the possession of the water diverted. This point was touched on earlier.
Sometimes, diversion only involves or results in a "control" of running water that falls short of possession-as
in the case of most appropriations to onstream storage. This clarification does not change or qualify the thesis of
this article. The point of this article is not that beneficial use is always possessory-it plainly is not. It is, rather,
that the water right, whose subject is flowing water, is never possessory. Thus, when diversion does result in the
possession of water, as in the Tulare case (and as it ultimately does in virtually all diversions for irrigation and
municipal and industrial purposes save hydroelectric generation), the rights in that water, to use it or dispose of
it, are possessory rights and in no manner include, or are any part of, the nonpossessory water right that was
exercised to take it from the watercourse. The right to use the watercourse and the right to use water taken from
it are completely different and separate rights.
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1.

RiparianRights

The route water rights originally took into American law, leading first to the
humid, eastern United States,62 came from the common law of England.63 Over
time, the strictly public or common character of rights in running water in

England was eroded by the loss of public access to watercourses over the wastes
and commons as a result of the Enclosure Movement, a legal, social, and
economic movement in which portions of lands subject to common rights passed
into purely private ownership and were fenced or otherwise enclosed, and that

historically traced England's transition from a feudal to a mercantile and
industrial society. 6' As time went on, only the owners of the enclosing private
estates came to have access to watercourses; and the doctrine of "riparian rights"
emerged as a positive rule of real property of the contiguous landed estates to
allocate the advantage provided by access to running water that was shared
exclusively by those private estates.
The doctrine of riparian rights arose, then, not out of any deliberate notion

that there was or should be property in watercourses, nor as a conscious policy
regarding the allocation of water resources, but as an accident of enclosure-a
social policy concerning land-and the inexorable operation of the law of
trespass to land. 66 Today, the "riparian right" is the right recognized in the owner
of land adjacent to or traversed by a watercourse (i.e., riparian land) to have the
stream of water flow to his land and, while passing, to make use of the flowing

water for reasonable purposes subject to the same, correlative rights of the other
riparian owners on the stream.67 It is a nonpossessory right that is part and parcel

62. It ran from the Eastern seaboard to the Hundredth Meridian states of North Dakota, South Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas. It was also embraced by the Pacific coast states of California, Oregon
and Washington. See DAVID B. ANDERSON, RIPARIAN WATER RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA, Background Paper No.
4, in GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW 10-11 (1977).
63. Wiel argued that the riparian doctrine came into the American common law directly from continental
law and was only later adopted by the English common law via the commentaries of the American jurists Kent
and Story. See WIEL, supra note 1, at 245, 342. The more widely held view is that the American doctrine
originated in the English common law. See WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 62.
64. Lauer, supra note 33, at 133, 184. The Enclosure Movement ran from the thirteenth to the nineteenth
centuries, but the height of the movement was the period from 1709, when the first parliamentary enclosure act
was passed, to 1869. The latter part of this period was highlighted by the General Enclosure Act of 1801, which
facilitated the passage of the private bills by which enclosure was accomplished, and by the Enclosure Act of
1845, which established an Enclosure Commission to facilitate the factual investigations and findings that an
individual enclosure bill required. 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 121 (1957); RONALD WALTER HARRIS, A
SHORT HISTORY OF 18TH CENTURY ENGLAND 23-25 (1963); CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE
DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 41-45, 282-83, 290-91 (1972).
65. Hence, the riparian right is an incident of land ownership, not as an easement or appurtenance but as
"part and parcel of the soil," i.e., as an intrinsic aspect of ownership. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 390-94
(1886); St. Helena Water Co. v. Forbes, 62 Cal. 182 (1882).
66. "The riparian's exclusive right to the use of water arises directly from the fact that nonriparians have
no access to the stream without trespass upon riparian lands." Lauer, supra note 33, at 163 (quoting
Munninghoff v. Wisc. Conservation Comm'n, 38 N.W.2d 712, 715 (1949)).
67. HUTCHINS, 2 WATER RIGHTS LAWS, supra note 6, at 183; see also Fall River Valley Irrigation Dist.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
of the riparian estate, which arises because, as a practical matter, the land's
natural, physical contiguity to the stream affords access to the flowing water.68
This last observation highlights the important point that, although the riparian
right accrues to the possession of land, it is not, itself, a possessory property
interest. 69 Rather, it is a nonpossessory right of use of the flowing water inhering
in the possession of the riparian land that abuts it. As a nonpossessory right of
use in the watercourse that benefits a possessory estate, the riparian right is thus
very much like an easement appurtenant: a nonpossessory and non-exclusive
right to the use of the contiguous watercourse, inuring to the possession of the
"dominant"-as it were-riparian estate. The riparian right is a right of use in the
naturally flowing water, not a property right in the substance of the water itself.7 °
2. Appropriative Rights
The other route the water right took into American jurisprudence was by way
of the particular ethic and custom of water use observed by the miners in the
foothill camps of the California gold rush, that "first in time is first in right," the
same rule of prior appropriation that they observed for their mining claims. 7' The
riparian doctrine found little or no application in the early West because the gold

v. Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 202 Cal. 56, 65 (1927); Herminghaus v. S. Cal. Edison, 200 Cal. 81, 93 (1926);
Vernon Irrigation Co. v. Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 237 (1895).
68. See Lucien Shaw, The Development of the Law of Waters in the West, 10 CAL. L. REV. 443, 447
(1921-1922); WIEL, supra note 1, at 758; Ventura Land & Power Co. v. Meiners, 136 Cal. 284, 290 (1902); see
also Lauer, supra note 33, at 162-63 (1958).
The riparian right is not a possessory right arising from ownership of the underlying or overlying soil.
WIEL, supra note 1, at 7-8. Ownership of the bed of the stream is immaterial to the existence of the riparian
right. The riparian right depends only on ownership of the river bank, which provides contiguity and hence
access. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 42, at 195; WIEL, supra note 1, at 763-72.
Furthermore:
The title to the soil constituting the bed of a river does not carry with it any exclusive right of
property in the running water of the stream, which can only be appropriated by severance, and which
may be lawfully appropriated by one having a right of access to it. It is, of course, necessary for the
existence of a riparian right that the land should be in contact with the flow of the stream; but lateral
contact is as goodjure naturae as vertical.
JOHN M. GOULD, LAW OF WATERS 297 (quoting Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., (1876) 1 App. Cas. 662
(H.L.)); see also id. at 393, 448.
69. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 390 (1886); Gould v. Eaton, 117 Cal. 539, 542 (1897). It is a
nonpossessory interest such as one may acquire to enter the land of another to drill for and extract oil and gas, a
particular kind of easement called a "profit A prendre." The close physical and doctrinal similarities between
water rights and profits i prendre is significant. See infra note 127.
70. "The riparian owner does not own the water. He has the right only to enjoy the advantage of a
reasonable use of the stream as it flows by his land .... " WIEL, supra note 1, at 755 (quoting Crawford v.
Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325 (1903)) (emphasis added). The riparian owner "has no property in the water itself; but a
simple use of it, while it passes along." JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES 95
(1854) (quoting Justice Story in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (D. R.I. 1827)).
71. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 147 (1855).
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fields and the lands abutting the rivers were not in private ownership but were,
rather, lands of the United States.72
From California, the rule of "prior appropriation" spread throughout
America's arid West, "the Great American Desert," where the vast majority of
land lay in the public domain and access to water was therefore not a practical
issue but scarcity was. In the West, the rule was (1) use conferred right and (2)
priority of use conferred priority of right. Today, this right is the appropriative
water right, or right of prior appropriation.73
As reflected in its name, the appropriative right is the right to "appropriate,"
i.e., to "take," water from a watercourse.74 Although the circumstances for

72. WELLS A. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW OF WATER RIGHTS 41-43 (1956).
73. California law has historically recognized different ways by which appropriative rights may be
acquired. Today, all appropriations must be made under the Water Code. See CAL. WATER CODE § 1225 (West
1971 & Supp. 2006); People v. Shirokow, 26 Cal. 3d 301 (1980).
74. "Diversion" is the term used for the physical act of appropriating water and the expression
"diversion rights" is often used as a synonym for appropriative water rights. As noted above, this article is
concerned with diversion that removes water from the watercourse and that thereby results in the possession of
the substance of the water so removed. But, as also noted, there are diversions that do not result in the removal
of water from the watercourse and in its immediate possession, as where a stream is dammed and its waters
impounded: diversion to storage. To place the discussion of diversion in context and to avoid any
misunderstanding or confusion in connection with this other type of diversion, a brief digression follows to
discuss the different kinds of diversion.
Appropriative water rights law recognizes both "direct diversions" and "diversions to storage." Direct
diversion (and diversion to offstream storage) result in the abstraction and separation of water from the
watercourse and its reduction to possession. The water thus diverted is completely separated from the
watercourse and under the exclusive control of the diverter. This is the type of diversion involved in TulareDWR' s separation of water from its natural source in the Delta.
While diversion under an appropriative right requires some sort of physical interaction with the
watercourse, see California Trout, Incorporated v. State Water Resources Control Board, 90 Cal. App. 3d 816,
819 (1979), not all diversions result in the factual or legal possession of the substance of the water diverted. One
type of diversion to storage, which entails damming a watercourse and creating a lake---called "onstream
storage"-does not usually involve separating the substance of the water from the watercourse, but rather
simply retarding its flow. Diversion in this case does not, of itself, result in the possession of water. Water
continues to enter the reservoir, mix with the impounded water, and exit the reservoir-just like the river inlets
and outlets of natural lakes: "Thus, while water may be exclusively appropriated by being separated from the
stream and confined in tanks, it does not cease to be aqua profluens merely by being impeded in its natural
channel by a water-power dam on a navigable stream." WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 67.
However, at some point the degree of impedance may become so great and the degree of mixing so little that
the impoundment may be deemed tantamount to possession. See WEL, supra note 1, at 34.
Of course, this kind of nonpossessory "control" of the watercourse is a necessarily temporary state,
because the impoundment is not for impoundment's sake (unless it is for recreational lake uses, which are
usually only incidental to other impoundment purposes). At some point, the impounded water must either be (1)
reduced to possession by complete removal for the intended offstream use; (2) released back into the
watercourse after its intended use (for power generation, for example); (3) released for rediversion downstream;
or (4) spilled (i.e., released and abandoned to the downstream watercourse for flood control or safety purposes
or for public regulatory purposes like minimum downstream flows or temperature control).
Regardless of its circumstances or purpose, released water again becomes fully part of the downstream
natural watercourse. Thus, even if in a particular case there is only such a minor degree of mixing and exchange
with the watercourse that a possession of the impounded water may be deemed to exist, that possession is
necessarily temporary and will ultimately give way either to the complete abstraction of the water for the
intended offstream use or to the return of the water to the watercourse below the dam. As noted in the
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acquiring an appropriative right and its secondary doctrinal characteristics
(manner of acquisition, transfer, place of use, etc.) differ from those of the
riparian right, the two rights share the same essential nature: the appropriative
right is, like the riparian right, a nonpossessory right in the watercourse "to
appropriate a certain portion of it"" and, where the diversion removes water from
the stream, to reduce it to possession. Neither right presupposes nor confers any
property in the water itself. 6 "Nothing is more firmly settled in the West than the
rule that an appropriator can have no ownership in the water, as such, in the
natural stream above the head of his canal or ditch, and that his right is solely one
to have the stream waterflow to his ditch so that it may be used."77
C. California Water Rights as Property in Running Water
California recognizes both appropriative and riparian rights in running water,
but the former are by far the more significant surface water rights in California.78
They are also the specific water rights held by DWR and at issue in Tulare.
Notwithstanding the separate routes they took into American and California
law, and the fact that the respective conditions and circumstances of entitlement
are different for each, the riparian and the appropriative rights doctrines today

discussion above, property in the substance of the water itself continues only so long as possession of the water
continues. Once water is turned back into the stream, whether by reservoir release or return flow, all property in
it ceases.
The Water Code's definition of "unappropriated water" includes "water which having been appropriated
or used flows back into a stream, lake, or other body of water." CAL. WATER CODE § 1202(d) (West 1971).
Even where, as under (3), above, water is intentionally released from storage for the purpose of diverting it
farther downstream (called "rediversion"), there is no right that attaches to the released water itself. The right to
"redivert storage releases" (so to speak) is simply a right in the watercourse, for which a water right is required,
to divert water downstream up to the released amount.
ESA regulation in Tulare involved only DWR's diversions (and rediversions) of water out of the Deltadirect diversions and diversion to offstream storage south of the Delta; and plaintiffs' alleged water-use rights
pertained only to the use of water thus separated from its natural source (the Delta) and reduced to possession
by DWR.
75. Vernon Irrigation Co. v. Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 237, 256 (1895) (describing the nature of the riparian
right). "The rights one can have in naturally running water are thus that of having it flow to him, and of using it
and taking it into his possession, thereby making private property of a part of it, during the time he holds it in
his possession." WIEL, supra note 1 at 756. "All water flowing in any natural channel . . . is hereby declared to
be public water of the State and subject to appropriationin accordance with the provisions of this code." CAL.
WATER CODE § 1201 (West 1971) (emphasis added).
76. Kidd v. Laird, 15 Cal. 161, 180 (1860). Unlike the riparian right, the appropriative right has no
necessary connection with the possession of land. It is thus more akin in its nature to an easement in gross. It
may in certain cases become appurtenant to the land to which water is diverted, and appurtenance may also be
severed. Wright v. Best, 19 Cal. 2d 368, 382 (1942).
77. WIEL, supra, note 1, at 20 (emphasis added). Wiel then cites no fewer than twenty-eight California
cases in support of this proposition. Id.
78. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO REVIEW CALIFORNIA WATER RIGHTS LAW, FINAL REPORT 11 (1978).
The dual system of riparian and appropriative rights is in fact known as the "California Doctrine." Other surface
water rights recognized in California, including pueblo rights and prescriptive rights, are generally of only
minor importance today.
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share the same essential character and reflect the same central property tenets,
which derive from their continental and common law origins and, ultimately,
from the physical character of the resource itself. Those tenets are that the water
right is a right in and to the use of running water; that running water is incapable
of possession and ownership; 79 that there is no property in the water itself; and
that water itself can only be possessed-and thereby become subject to the rights
of possession and ownership-by being diverted from the stream and thereby
reduced to possession.
79. California v. Superior Court, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1019, 1027 (2000).
80. Parks Canal & Mining Co. v. Hoyt, 57 Cal. 44, 46 (1880). As discussed in a previous note,
possession and the right to possession are essential to the common law concept of ownership. See supra note 47.
Conversely, ownership implies the ability to possess. Thus, statements averring the public or state "ownership"
of water tend to obfuscate and confuse the essential, nonpossessory nature of property in running water and, in
turn, the distinction between the nonpossessory water right and the possessory rights in water diverted from the
watercourse.
In 1911, the California Legislature enacted what is now Water Code section 102, declaring that all
running water in the state is the "property of the people": "All water within the State is the property of the
people of the State, but the right to the use of water may be acquired by appropriation in the manner provided
by law." CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (West 1971). This section was explicated in Palmer v. RailroadCommission,
167 Cal. 163, 168 (1914), and a literal, proprietary reading of it emphatically rejected: "The true reason for the
rule that there can be no property in the corpus of the water ...in a stream is not that it is dedicated to the
public, but because of the fact that so long as it continues to run there cannot be that possession of it which is
essential to ownership."
In other words, if a resource is incapable of ownership, it is meaningless to declare that it is "owned by
the people." One might as easily (and idly) say that the air is "owned" by the people. See Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (Holmes, J.) ("To put the claim of the state upon tide is to lean upon a slender reed.
Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and possession is the beginning of ownership."). In Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982), the Supreme Court declared "state ownership" of water to be a "legal
fiction," as it had three years previously in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1979), for the
ownership of wild animals. A lucid exposition of the point was made by Professor Trelease. Frank J. Trelease,
Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638, 652 (1957). His conclusion was that
the assertion that the "people" (or the "state" or the "public") own certain resources-when ownership
intrinsically makes no sense, and the people or state therefore never actually exercise property-type rights or
powers-serves as a statement that there is a strong public interest in the resource and it will readily be the
subject of the state's protection and stewardship in the interest of the people in the exercise of sovereign or
governmental power. (N.B.: The character and scope of authority that this sovereign interest may assume, such
as in the public trust-where proprietary terminology has been invoked to describe that character and scope of
authority-is not relevant to the discussion in this article, which strictly concerns the nature of property rights
in, not sovereign authority over, running water.)
This same view was echoed by B. Abbot Goldberg: "State 'ownership' of water rights concerns the
political rights of a state to control, by its police power, the conduct of appropriators; it does not concern
property rights in any ordinary sense." B. Abbott Goldberg, Interposition-WildWest Water Style, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1964). These views comport rather with the more accurate articulations of the state's interest in
water in California Water Code sections 104 and 105:
§ 104. It is hereby declared that the people of the State have a paramount interest in the use of all the
water of the State and that the State shall determine what water of the State, surface and
underground, can be converted to public use of controlled for public protection.
§ 105. It is hereby declared that the protection of the public interest in the development of the water
resources of the State is of vital concern to the people of the State, and that the State shall determine
in what way the water of the State, both surface and underground, should be developed for the
greatest public benefit.
CAL.WATER CODE §§ 104, 105 (West 1971). Finally, Water Code section 102 was revisited and examined at
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These tenets may be alternatively rephrased as four essential characteristics
of the appropriative water right as property in "water":
(1) The water right is, specifically, a right to take water from a
watercourse.S
(2) The "property"-in the sense of the res or subject matter to which
the water right attaches is not "water" but "running water," i.e., the
watercourse.
(3) The water right is a nonpossessory right of property.
(4) While the water right is a right of property in the watercourse, it
confers no property, no ownership, and no right of possession in the
substance of the water itself.
A fifth point may be added regarding water after it has been diverted:
(5) Upon being diverted from a watercourse, water is no longer part of
the watercourse. That water is then no longer the subject matter of
the water right but is a substance factually and legally capable of
possession and hence of possessory rights.82

length by the Court of Appeal in California v. Superior Court of Riverside County, 78 Cal. App. 4th 1019
(2000). Many of the court's observations are pertinent to the discussion here: "It is perhaps unfortunate that the
word 'property' is sometimes used in the cases and statutes with no careful consideration of the nuances of its
meaning. The same may be said of 'own,' 'owner,' and 'ownership."' Id. at 1027. "Read in context with
provisions of statute and decisional law relating to water use, the Water Code provisions simply do not result in
anything recognizable as 'ownership' as the term is commonly understood." Id. at 1028.
Section 102 is an example of what the United States Supreme Court has called "a fiction expressive
in legal shorthand of the importance to its people that a state have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource." Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 951 (1982). This power,
of course, derives from the police power conferred by the United States Constitution ... the State's
power under the Water Code is to control and regulate use; such a power is distinct from the concept
of "ownership" used in the Civil Code and in common usage.
Id. at 1030. Therefore, to repeat what the California Supreme Court observed in Palmer v. Railroad
Commission almost one hundred years ago, the reason private ownership of running water is impossible is not
because it is owned by the public, but because the possession of running water essential to the concept of
ownership is impossible. No one can own it. Rights in running water are, necessarily, nonpossessory rights. 167
Cal. at 168.
81. Or, to control water in a watercourse.
82. In Palmer,the court said:
One may have the right to take water from the stream, even the exclusive right to do so, but in
that case he does not have the right to a specific particle of water until he has taken it from the
stream and reduced it to possession. It then ceases to be part of the stream.
167 Cal. at 168.
Wiel summarized the essential property principles as follows:
§ 691. Systems of Water Law are but a Development of These Three First Principles:
a. The running water of natural streams is, as a corpus, the property of no one.
b. The substantial property right recognized by the law is the usufruct of the stream-the
right to the flow and use of the natural resource.

485
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D. The Tulare Court's View
The Tulare court's view of the plaintiffs' rights, however, focused on the
plaintiffs' so-called "water-use rights," a term it adopted to describe rights to use
water after diversion as end users of water-not the right to divert from the Delta
but the right to use water for their particular agricultural purposes.83 This view
differs profoundly from the five points above.
The "water-use right," a right to use water after diversion, is something other
than a right in or to use of the watercourse. Such a right implies a property in the
substance of the water itself, which, if it exists, logically must attach to the water
while running in the stream and follow it from the stream to the place of
beneficial use. 4 A "water-use right" also implies a possessory nature to the water
right: the use of water diverted from the stream and in the user's possession is,
definitionally, the exercise of a possessory right. Such use entails the disposition
of a discrete parcel of water that is completely under the user's control.85 The
Tulare court saw the water right, then, as far more than just the nonpossessory
right to divert and saw the res of the water right as more than just the
watercourse.86

The court's view of the water right as a right in the substance of the water
rather than in the body of flowing water-a confusion over the property subject
matter of the water right--evidences the mischief worked by the ambiguity in the
term "water." At the same time, the court's focus on the plaintiffs' loss of the
post-diversion use of water as the particular entitlement they held, especially in
finding a per se taking, implicates the second ambiguity in water rights
terminology-the ambiguity in the term "use."

c.

Any specific portion of the water severed from the stream and reduced to possession is
private property as a corpus (while so held in possession only).
WIEL, supra note 1, at 758.
83. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 246, 318-19 (2001).
84. If the asserted right did not attach to water in the stream before diversion but only upon or after
diversion, then there could not have been a taking of any such right by a regulation that prevented the diversion
of the water from occurring. But if the assertion is that the right attaches to the water before diversion, it is
contradicted by the legion of water law cases in California that uniformly acknowledge that there is no property
in the corpus of the flowing water.
85. "So the particles of water that have passed into private control in a reservoir, ditch, or other
waterworks or artificial structure that holds the water confined have been taken from their natural haunts, so to
speak, and captured." WIEL, supra note 1, at 28. The substance of water diverted from the stream is both welldefined and under the physical control of the diverter. It thus meets the physical requirements of possession.
86. The Court of Federal Claims' treatment of the plaintiffs' loss of only a portion of the water
otherwise available and deliverable under their contracts with DWR as a complete taking of that portion of
water rather than as merely a diminution in the value or use of the whole right further evidences the court's
view of the water right as a property or estate in the individual molecules of water. It also comports with takings
law applicable to the physical invasion of possessory property interests. See MELTZ, ET AL., supra note 4, at
117-24.
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Ill. WATER RIGHTS: THE RIGHT TO "USE" WATER

Like the word "water" in the title to Part II of this article, the word "use" is
highlighted in the title to this Part to emphasize the ambiguity that attaches to its
meaning when the term is employed in phrases such as "the right to use water" or
"use right." But, unlike water, the problematic ambiguity of use is not caused by
its having more than one specific meaning. Use is a broad and adaptable term
whose particular meaning is given by the thing being used. In water rights law, it
is the uncertain meaning of water that makes the meaning of use uncertain in
phrases such as "the right to use water."
Given that the subject matter of the water right is running water, one should
expect the use of running water to be the activity entitled by the water right. But,
one often finds water rights being referred to as the "right to divert and use
water" ;87 or, as the court in Tulare did, the "right to the use of water,"88 implicitly
connecting the water right not just with the use of running water (by diverting it),
but with the later use of the water diverted-with what is generally called
"beneficial use."
Setting aside for the moment whether such statements are correct (and they
are not) it is nonetheless important to recognize why they are made. Linking
diversion with the subsequent use of diverted water is a very natural,
understandable, and usually innocuous thing to do. After all, the opportunity to
use water beneficially is created by the act of diversion and often flows
immediately from it; and the value in the subsequent use of water is the very
motivation for diverting it in the first place. Furthermore, it is usually
unimportant to distinguish between the right to divert water from a stream and
the right to use the water diverted because the diverter-irrigator who turns water
from the stream into his ditch is also at that moment the first possessor and the
immediate owner of the water diverted. 9 As a practical matter, who is to care if
the right to divert and the right to make possessory use of the diverted water are
one right or two rights when the diverter and the possessor are the same person?
Finally, combining the right of diversion with subsequent beneficial use offers a
convenient and usually inconsequential shorthand that imparts the essential social

87. "The appropriative right is the right to divert and use a specific quantity of water for reasonable
beneficial use...." ARTHUR L. LITTLEWORTH & ERIC. L. GARNER, CALIFORNIA WATER 39 (1995) (emphasis
added). This is perhaps the most frequently used expression in California water law that unconsciously and
erroneously conflates the right to divert and the right to make beneficial use of diverted water: The phrasing is
such that the right seems to entitle both diversion and subsequent use. A more accurate articulation is found in
the same work regarding riparian rights: "The right to divert for reasonable beneficial use ... ." Id. at 29
(emphasis added). "Reasonable beneficial use" is clearly identified as the purpose or goal, rather than an
entitlement, of the right (diversionfor reasonable beneficial use). See infra note 97 for other examples.
88. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 318 n.6.
89. Diversion is both the act entitled by the water right and the act by which water is reduced to
possession. Possession confers a title good against all but the true owner. Where there exists no title, first
possession itself confers title: "The owner is allowed to exclude all, and is accountable to no one. The possessor
is allowed to exclude all but one, and is accountable to no one but him." HOLMES, supra note 47, at 193.
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and economic significance of the diversion right, which lies in how the diverted
water is ultimately used.90
But in the Court of Federal Claims's decision in Tulare, ignoring the
distinction between the right to divert water from a watercourse and the separate
right to use diverted water and combining them under the single rubric of the
"water right" was not inconsequential. In Tulare, the diverter and the beneficial
users were not the same, they were different. The plaintiffs claimed rights to use
diverted water derived from DWR's water rights but separate and apart from
DWR's right to divert it. Thus, the distinction between the right of diversion and
the right of subsequent use was very much in issue in this case and could not be
harmlessly ignored.
A.

Clarifying the "Use" that the Water Right Entitles

The first reason that the court's view of water rights as property departed so
significantly from the five points above was the ambiguity in the term "water"
and the confusion between water and watercourses. The second reason was the
confusion, induced by that first ambiguity, in the term "use." One very telling
indication of this latter confusion was the court's reference to the plaintiffs'
"water-use rights" as usufructuary rights.
Water rights are often referred to as usufructuary rights-a term that literally
denotes "use rights." 9' And, in the way that water rights have been considered to
be "usufructs," they are indeed properly thought of as "use rights. ' 2 But, the
critical question is whether the water right "use right" is the same thing as the
Court of Federal Claims's "water-use right"? The answer is, no. They are
completely different because they are rights to the use of different property
subject matters--different kinds of water.
Like the term "water," "use" also has two distinctly different applications in
water rights doctrine that are easily and often confused. The first "use," referred
to as a usufruct, is the use of running water-the usufruct of the stream-and is

90. The lack of precision in the use of language can indicate many things. But most often it simply
means either that a more precise or discriminating meaning of a particular term or phrase is not important in the
context in which it is used or that the context itself is sufficiently indicative of the intended meaning. Thus, if
the context either does not require that "running water" be distinguished from other forms of water or clearly
indicates which meaning of "water" is intended, then the shorthand term "water" is sufficient---even where
"running water" is intended. This is the case of the Water Code itself. See infra note 103 and accompanying
text. The benefit of this kind of shorthand is, as with any shorthand, simplification and ease of communication.
The downside is the tendency to forget that it is a shorthand when a different context requires that "running
water" be distinguished from other forms of water.
91. Usufruct combines usus and fructus, meaning respectively, "use" and "fruit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 693, 1580-81 (8th ed. 2004).
92. "This usufructuary right, or 'water-right,' is the substantial right with regard to flowing waters ....
[I]t is not an ownership in the water itself; it is merely a privilege to use the water, and hence purely
incorporeal." WIEL, supranote 1, at 755.
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synonymous with "diversion."93 The second "use," often called "beneficial use,"
is the use of diverted water-not of running water. They are completely different.
One does not have a usufructuary interest (i.e., a use right) in water already in
one's possession,94 and beneficially using water that has been diverted out of a

stream is not the use of a watercourse. "Priorto the segregation of water from
the general source, the proprietary right is usufructuary in character." 95 After the
segregation of water from its natural source, the proprietary right in the
segregated water is not usufructuary; it is possessory.9 6
The 1872 California Civil Code, which codified much of the common law,
contained the first statutory treatment of appropriative water rights. Sections
1410 and 1411 distinguished between the right to use flowing water and
beneficial use:
Section 1410. The right to the use of running water flowing in a river or
stream, or down a cafion ravine, may be acquired by appropriation.
Section 1411. The appropriation must be for some useful or beneficial
purpose, and whether the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases
to use it for such purpose the right ceases.97

93. Wiel quotes Blackstone on this point and adds: "To avoid misunderstanding, it must be well noted
that this passage [from Blackstone's Commentaries] distinguishes the corpus of water from the usufructuary
right in the stream .... " Id. at 757 (emphasis added).
94. As will be discussed below, the term "usufruct" is used in water rights doctrine in a manner entirely
unrelated to its civil law origins-primarily to signify the nonpossessory, non-ownership nature of the water
right. The idea that one holds a nonpossessory right of use in something one possesses such as diverted wateris a contradiction in terms. It is the same as holding an easement in one's own land, a nonpossessory right to use
the land one possesses. Because conveyances can cause the merging of interests in servient and dominant
estates, the implicit illogic of holding an easement in one's own land must be formally dealt with. Thus,
California Civil Code section 805 explicitly prohibits the owner of a servient tenement from holding an
easement in his own land and section 811 provides that, where the holder of an easement (the owner of a
dominant tenement) later acquires title to the servient tenement, the nonpossessory easement is extinguished.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 805, 811 (West 1971).
95. WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 57, at 349 (emphasis added).
96. Palmer v. R.R. Comm'n, 167 Cal. 163, 167 (1914); see also HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW,
supra note 72, at 36-40.
97. CAL. Ctv. CODE §§ 1401-1411 (1872) (emphasis added). When the Civil Code was amended in
1911, it retained the section 1410 wording. 1911 Cal. Stat. ch. 407, at 821. When these provisions were later
transferred from the Civil Code to the state's new Water Code in 1943, the reference to "the use of running
water flowing in rivers, etc." was replaced with the shorthand expression "the use of water." See CAL. WATER
CODE § 102. Section 1411 became Water Code section 1240. The Code Commission Notes following Water
Code section 102 state that "the deletion of the reference to running water is not intended to expand the
definition of water subject to appropriation," but to facilitate the writing of any possible future amendments.
The unintended and unfortunate result was to remove a clear statutory statement that running water is the proper
res of the water right as property and that the "use of water" conferred by the water right is the use of running
water.
The phrase "useful or beneficial purposes," rather than "beneficial use" fortuitously helps to avoid the
confusion between use of the stream (diversion) and the use of diverted water. The 1914 Water Commission
Act also used this helpful phrasing extensively, including in provisions that now appear in Water Code sections
1004, 2002, 1253, 1390, 1396, 1627, 1675, etc. However, "beneficial use" was the phrasing used in the 1928
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Use of the watercourse-of running water-is the use entitled by the water
right. Beneficial use of the appropriated water, on the other hand, the purposefor
which an appropriation must be made, is the use of water enabled by the water
right. To merge beneficial use with the water right itself is to confuse what the
right entitles with what it merely enables.9
Thus, when the Court of Federal Claims invoked the plaintiffs' "usufructuary
rights," it was attaching the usufruct to the wrong subject matter: diverted water.
It was confusing the plaintiffs' so-called "water-use rights"-meaning rights to
make beneficial use of diverted water-with usufructuary rights, which properly
denote the rights to use (i.e., to divert) running water-water rights DWR alone
held and exercised.
"Usufruct" is an unusual term to begin with, more unusual perhaps than is
generally acknowledged. Because "usufruct" is used so often and so
authoritatively in water rights law to convey a sense of "use-right" but never, it
seems, with any explanation of what it actually means, the inquiry into how the
term "use" is used and misused in California water rights law cannot avoid an
examination of the use and meaning of "usufruct."
This examination reveals that the usufruct actually has only the most
colloquial and superficial applicability to common law water rights doctrine.
Nonetheless, understanding how and why the term has been used to describe
water rights is helpful to highlight the key distinction between the use of the
watercourse, which is entitled by the water right, and the use of water diverted
from the watercourse (beneficial use), which is enabled by the water right. With
this important distinction in mind, the discussion of "use" will then consider, in

Amendment (Article 10, section 2) and it is now the exemplar for contemporary usage.
98. Because of this confusion, entitlement versus enablement is an important analytic perspective in the
discussion of the water right as a property right. It distinguishes those interests and abilities that the right
specifically confers from the advantages and opportunities that are merely made possible or facilitated by the
exercise of those interests and abilities. A familiar, everyday example of the distinction between what a right
entitles and what it only enables may be found in the large warehouse-type stores that require purchase of a
"store membership." Store membership confers the right to use the store-to enter and make purchases. But
membership alone, entitling a person to use the store, does not of itself entitle a person to use or possess an item
of merchandise in the store. That use is merely enabled by store membership, specifically by purchasing and
thus acquiring title to the item. It is, at that point, the member's ownership of the item that entitles its use-not
his store membership.
While the distinction is important-particularly where the taking of a property entitlement is
compensable but the "taking" of an expectancy or opportunity is not-it is also elementary, and further
illustrations of what a right entitles (i.e., what it is a right to) as opposed to what it only enables (i.e., the
opportunities its exercise creates) may be easily put forth:
A trust to provide for the beneficiary's education entitles the beneficiary to use the proceeds for
education. It enables the beneficiary to acquire an education; but it does not entitle the
beneficiary to acquire an education.
A driver's license entitles one to operate a motor vehicle upon the state's roadways. It enables
the licensee to drive to San Francisco. But it does not entitle the licensee to drive to San
Francisco; and if a lawful governmental act blocks highway access to San Francisco, the holder
of a driver's license has not been deprived of any right, compensable or otherwise, conferred
by his license.
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turn, (1) the close and instructive similarity of the water right to the species of
easement known as the profit A prendre and, in particular, to oil and gas rights;
(2) the water right as a legal power whose exercise "links" the nonpossessory
right to use the watercourse by diversion with the possessory right to make
beneficial use of the diverted water (the so-called "water-use right"); and (3) the
separate role of beneficial use in California water rights law not as an economic
opportunity for the individual but as a condition and obligation imposed upon the
water right for the benefit of society.
1. The Water Right as a Usufruct
In recognizing a unique and limited property right in running water,
California courts have used an expression earlier common law jurists and
commentators had taken from Roman law and the European civil law, declaring
the private interest in running water to be "usufructuary" and the right to be not
ownership but "a usufruct in the stream." 99 California courts have often repeated
that water rights are "usufructuary" or "usufructs."
The usufruct was an important element of Roman law. Today, it is an
essential construct in the civil law of continental Europe, which is followed in the
United States only by the State of Louisiana. °" It is not a fundamental property
principle of the English or American common law, but the term has been
employed on occasion in various American jurisdictions, for different but largely
descriptive purposes.'0 ' That is how it has been employed in connection with
water rights. Water rights are most often described as being usufructuary rather
than formally denominated as "usufructs." But for as often as some form of the
term has been applied to water rights, no case has ever actually defined what a
"usufruct" is or what "usufructuary" means.
In the civil law, a usufruct is the "right to the use, enjoyment, and avail of
property belonging to another," a personal right in property that is owned by
someone else, usually for the life of the usufructuary right holder. 0 2 As a rule, the
right applies to property that is not consumed by use and enjoins upon the

99. Pope v. Kinman, 54 Cal. 3, 5 (1879).
100. Louisiana's Civil Code was derived from the Civil Code of France (the Code Napoleon). VERNON
VALENTINE PALMER, THE LOUISIANA CIVILIAN EXPERIENCE: CRITIQUES OF CODIFICATION IN A MIXED
JURISDICTION 52-53 (2005).
101.
WIEL, supra note 1, at 15-18 (referring to English and American commentators, including
Blackstone, Story, and Kent). Although the term is not included in the California Civil Code, as a species of
servitude or otherwise (see California Civil Code sections 801 and 802), the term has been used, for example, to
describe the interest of a lessee of government land for purposes of property taxation. See Douglas Aircraft v.
Byram, 57 Cal. App. 2d 311, 317 (1943); Hammond Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal. App. 235, 240
(1930). More typical is its use in Smith v. Cooley, 65 Cal. 46, 47-48 (1884), where the court described a "mining
right" as "usufructuary in its nature and character." Today, a "mining right" would clearly be classified as a
profit Aprendre.
102. "Usufruct is a real right of limited duration on the property of another." 28 AM. JUR. 2D Estates § 6;
see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 535 (2006).
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usufructuary °3 an obligation not to damage the property in derogation of the
owner's title and right of subsequent use and enjoyment.' Moreover, the
usufructuary right may be possessory" 5 and, as to all but the "naked owner,"
exclusive and absolute. °6 "The usufructuary's right of enjoyment comprises two
elements: the right to draw fruits and the right to possess and use things. After
the usufructuary has taken possession, his right to use the thing is, in principle,
as extensive as that of the owner."'0 7
While the "drawing of fruits" aspect of the usufruct comports with water
rights being a right to divert (i.e., to draw the fruit of water from the stream), the
"right to possess" aspect does not. The one essential feature of running water as
the subject matter of property rights is that it is altogether incapable of
possession. Thus, it is important to recognize that when the water right is
declared to be "usufructuary" or a "mere usufruct," it means something quite
different from the possessory and exclusive present interest in property that the
civil law usufructuary can have.'

103. "Usufructuary" is an adjective used to describe the right and as a noun to denote the holder of the
usufruct.
104. It is quite similar in this way to the common law life tenant's obligation to the reversioner or
remainor not to commit waste. In fact, the construct of the usufruct as a servitude or encumbrance on ownership
largely accomplished for the civil law what the division of fee simple into lesser possessory estates (life
tenancies) and interests (tenancies for a period of years) accomplished for the common law. BROWDER ET AL.,
supra note 47, at 57.
105. As to non-consumable "things," the Louisiana Civil Code states that "the usufructuary has the right
to possess them and to derive the utility, profits, and advantages that they may provide." LA. CIv. CODE art. 539
(2006) (emphasis added). As to consumables, the usufructuary owns them. Id. art. 538 (emphasis added). Apart
from its tenure limitations and its prohibition on waste, the usufruct-like the life tenancy-may include every
substantial right of ownership, including possession, control, and the right to exclude others.
106. The civil law usufruct is predicated on there being an owner of the property, with an implicit focus
on the present rights and conduct of the user vis-a-vis the future rights of the owner. See id. art. 535; id. bk. II,
tit. 1I1, Personal Servitudes: Exposd des Motifs, ch. 2, § 2 (1980).
107. Id. (emphasis added); see also OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 478 (2002) (defining "usufruct" as
"the right of temporary possession, use, or enjoyment of the advantages of property belonging to another, so far
as it may be had without causing damage or prejudice to this") (emphasis added). The French Civil Code
expressly states that the usufruct is the right to enjoy the property of another as the owner himself: "L'usufruit
est le droit de jouir des choses dont un autre a lapropriiti,comme le propritairelui-mgme, mais b lacharge
d'en conserver la substance." C. cIv. art. 578 (France). It appears in fact that possession had pivotal
significance in the development of the usufruct in the Roman law:
There was a further type of servitude the Romans called personal, i. e. [sic], in gross, that had no
estate to depend upon and could be applied to realty as to personalty. The most characteristic form of
it was the usufructus ....What gave it its particular value to Romans was that it enabled interests in
the res itself to be created which the contracts of letting and hiring, of mandate, and the "real"
contracts, were generally unable to effect. This was due to the fact that the usufruct conferred
'possession' and these contracts did not ....
Max Radin, FundamentalConcepts of the Roman Law XV, 13 CAL. L. REV. 207, 218 (1925).
108. The idea that one has a "mere" usufructuary right, or use right, in a stream makes sense: it means
that the property right in the stream to divert water from it is limited and less than ownership, which implies the
ability to exercise complete and exclusive dominion over what is owned. But the proposition that one has a
"mere" right to use the substance of the water that has been taken from the stream and reduced to possession is
simply fatuous. There is nothing "mere" about the right to make full, possessory, and exclusive use of property.
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Obviously, the California water right is not, literally, a usufruct within the
civil law's meaning of the term.' °9 Nor is it literally usufructuary, if the meaning

To say that one can only use the diverted water one possesses-i.e., one can only grow crops or generate
electricity or manufacture goods or bathe in it or drink it-in other words, can only control it, apply it to use,
and reap every last reward it can offer, to the exclusion of all others-but cannot own it-is like the old joke
about the person who didn't want to be a millionaire but only wanted to live like one. The mistake lies in
confusing nonpossessory "use rights" in the stream, which are inherently limited and non-exclusive and, at their
fullest, fall short of ownership, with the exclusive "rights of use" of diverted water, which are simply the
constituent "sticks" in the bundle of possessory property rights and which, together, are ownership.
Wiel notes the confusion of a Colorado appellate court on this very point, a confusion that is undoubtedly
much more common than not:
Unfortunately, the distinction [between the usufruct of the stream and ownership of the corpus of the
water in the stream] has not always been appreciated. For example, in an overruled Colorado case it
was said: "The distinction attempted to be drawn between the right to use water and the title to it is
purely mythical and imaginary, and the sooner it is dropped, and the two are treated as identical, the
better, and less confusion will exist." Wyatt v. Larimer etc. Co. (1892) 1 Colo. App. 480, 29 Pac.
913.
WIEL, supra note 1, at 20 n.2.
The Colorado court's frustration is understandable, if misplaced. If the res of the "right to use" were in
fact the same as the res to which "title" attached, i.e., the substance of the water, then the distinction between
the right to use water and title to it would indeed be mythical. But it is not the same. The Colorado court, just
like the Court of Federal Claims, failed to recognize that there are actually two different res involved and that
"water" refers to two completely different things: running water (in which there is but a right of use) and water
reduced to possession (in which title exists).
Wiel quotes Chasemore v. Richards, 7 H.L. Cas. 349 (1859), on this same point in criticizing the
application of the principle that ownership of the surface includes ownership of everything above and below
(expressed in the common law maxim, cujus est solum, ejus usque ad coelum et ad inferos) to water flowing
over private land as the source of the riparian right, saying it is "founded on a mistake between the property in
the water itself [ownership] and the right to have its continual flow [the usufruct]." WIEL, supra note 1, at 767
(emphasis added).
In fact, the first California water case to invoke the usufruct (and the first California water case at all)
similarly failed to make a clear distinction between the two res, between water (the substance) and running
water, and hit upon an infelicitous but amazingly often-quoted turn of phrase: "The right of property in water is
usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its use." Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal.
246, 249 (1852). The problem with this passage begins with the fact that the phrase, "the right of property...
consists not so much of the fluid itself," does not make literal sense. "Fluid" is not a "right"-of property or
anything else. A fluid is a substance, a gas or liquid, which may be property in the sense of the subject matter of
property interests (what this article calls the "res"), but not a rightof property.
But much more important and relevant to the confusion attending use and usufructs, is that the antecedent
of "its" (in "its use") is "the fluid itself." Thus, the phrase utterly fails to distinguish between the flow of water
and the substance of the water. Considering only the substance of the water, the passage literally says: there is
no ownership ofthefluid but "only" a right to use the fluid. That is, only a right to use the molecules, the water
qua water-which in turn sounds exactly like not owning a million dollars but "only" being able to spend itvery much a "mythical and imaginary distinction." It was in fact this language from Eddy v. Simpson that the
Court of Federal Claims quoted to support its view that the "plaintiffs' sole entitlement is to the use of the
water." Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (2001).
The mischief created by the unfortunate phrasing in Eddy, however, also lies in its being taken out of
context. Two sentences later, Eddy helps to correct the antecedent problem by expressly stating: "The right is
not in the corpus of the water .... " That is, the water right is not in the fluid, not in water qua water. The right
is, as it can only be, in the flowing water.
109. Tellingly, the French riparian right-the only private water right recognized in the French Civil
Code-is not a usufruct either; nor is the Louisiana riparian right. They are, rather, like the American riparian
right, a substantive right of use inhering in riparian proprietorship-not a personal servitude or encumbrance
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of that term is to refer to the formal, civil law usufruct. "Usufructuary" can only
have the looser, informal sense of "like a usufruct"-although in what way or to
what degree the water right is "like a usufruct" is never expressly stated in the
substantial body of California case law that has used the term.
Rather than having the formal, developed meaning it has in the civil law, the
courts in California have used the expression usufruct/usufructuary less to
convey what the water right is than to convey what it is not: that the water right is
not a right of possession or ownership of water. One can "use the stream" as the
water passes by--draw its fruits, as it were-but one cannot assert dominion over
the flowing water or over the substance of the water itself. The use of the term is
almost invariably accompanied by the statement that there is no property in or
ownership of the substance of the water.1 °
In sum, the civil law usufruct is a non-ownership right in which possession is
possible; whereas the water right "usufruct" is a non-ownership right because
possession is impossible. The expression, juxtaposed with the absence of
property in the substance of the flowing water itself, means the usufruct of the
flowing stream: the nonpossessory right to use the running water, to draw the
fruit of water from the watercourse, and not the right to later use the diverted
water."'
This, however, is not how the Tulare court used the term. Identifying the
plaintiffs as end-users of water holding "water-use rights," the court stated:
"[P]laintiffs' sole entitlement is to the use of the water.... To the extent, then,
that the federal government ... ha[s] rendered the usufructuary right to that
water valueless, they have thus effected a physical taking."' 12 There is no water
right, however, and therefore no usufruct, in the corpus or molecules or specific
parcel of flowing water. There is no "that water," as in the court's phrase "the
usufructuary right to that water."

upon the ownership of another. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 656, 657 (2006); C. civ. art. 644 (France); see also Wiel,
supranote 46, at 253-61.
2 WILLIAM
110. "A party hath only the usufruct; and not the absolute property of the soil."
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 105 (1766). The usage is all but tautological,
usufruct being used to denote the absence of ownership. It is a term with essentially no contextual reference in
the common law, whose principal function, in being both singular and exotic, is to impart a sense of authority.
Professor Trelease refers to an engaging discussion of this phenomenon in Alf Ross, TU-TU, 70 HARV. L. REV.
812 (1957). Trelease, Government Ownership, supra note 80, at 638.
111. Wiel observed:
[T]he corpus of the water in the stream itself, as a substance, is not the subject of property, and ...
one may have only the strictly usufructuary right to the flow and use of the stream. Were the
principles to be, to any great extent, so applied as to regard cases as based upon property rights in
running water as a substance, it would be a misapplication, for their true force lies in showing the
opposite-that controversies must, as a rule, be decided with regard to the flow and use of the
naturalwater supply, and not its corpus; for the usufruct of the natural resource (and not the water
itself) is alone of practical importance.
WIEL, supra note 1, at 45 ("corpus" italicized in original, other italics added for emphasis).
112. Tulare, 49 Fed. Cl. at 319.
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The Court of Federal Claims, focusing on the plaintiffs' loss of the irrigation
use of the water expected to be provided under their contracts with DWR, applied
the water rights terms "usufruct" and "use-right" to a different res than the res of
the water right. The court did not apply them to flowing water but misapplied
them to the substance of the water itself. Almost certainly it did so because it did
not recognize the ambiguity in the term "use" that arises because there are two
different manners of use integrally involved in California water law, each
associated with a different physical form of water. 113
113. As noted at the beginning of this article, the failure to distinguish between the meanings of "use"
and "water"-the use of flowing water and the beneficial use of diverted water-has had a material influence in
other recent judicial decisions besides Tulare. One is the 2006 decision of the Utah Supreme Court in the
Uintah Basin adjudication, involving the rights of United States Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) contractors
under Utah law and under the terms of their federal contracts. In this case, the Utah court, quoting an earlier
decision, stated:
The right to the use of water, although a property right, is very different from the ownership of
specific property which is subject to possession, control and use as the property owner sees fit. Such
right does not involve the ownership of a specific body of water but is only a right to use a given
amount of the transitory waters of a stream or water source for a specific time, place and purpose
In re Uintah Basin, 133 P.3d 410, 421 (Utah 2006) (quoting United States v. District Court (Strawberry), 121
Utah 1, 238 P.2d 1132, 1134 (1951) (emphasis added)). After this very accurate articulation of the distinction
between water rights in flowing water and possessory ownership rights in a parcel of water, the court went on to
conclude, however:
Accordingly, it is not sufficient to ask only who has title to water or in whose name a certificate of
appropriation has been issued. The governing statute ... affords the certificate of appropriation only
the status of 'prima facie evidence of the [certificate] owner's right to the use of water.' Here it is
undisputed that the right of use rests with Strawberry.
Id. (emphasis added).
After speaking of the right to use the "transitory waters of a stream," which is "very different from the
ownership of a specific body of water," the court concluded that Strawberry, the beneficial user of the body of
diverted water-not the United States, the diverter/user of the transitory waters of the stream-holds the
"undisputed right of use" accorded by the water right. Id. Based on the passage first quoted, however, the "title"
was the certificate of appropriation; the owner of this title was the USBR, and the user of water under the title
(i.e., the appropriator/diverter) was the USBR-not Strawberry.
Another recent decision is that of the California Court of Appeal in the State Water Resources Control
Board Cases, 136 Cal. App. 4th 674 (2006), in which the court addressed the meaning of the term "legal user of
water" in California Water Code section 1702. Section 1702, based on the common law "no injury" principle,
provides protection for "any legal user of water" from injury caused by a proposed change in point of diversion
or place or purpose of use by a statutory appropriator (i.e., a permittee or licensee). The court recognized that,
under the common law, only diverters-the holders of water rights-were legal users of water and thus entitled
to assert protection against harmful changes in the exercise of senior appropriations. The specific issue before
the court was whether contractors, or other parties who do not hold water rights but who make beneficial use of
the water diverted by others, are also legal users of water under section 1702. The court concluded they are. The
court's analysis of the meaning of "legal user of water" in section 1702, based upon an asserted "plain
meaning" of the phrase, would have been more robust had the court been clearly presented with the issue of the
dual and often-conflated meanings of the terms that comprise the phrase. The three potentially harmful water
right permit changes that are the subject of the rule are, specifically, ones in which changes affect the regimen of
flowing water, through their effect on the relative location of diversions from the watercourse (changes in point
of diversion), on timing of diversion from the watercourse (especially changes in purpose of use), and on return
flow amounts and patterns (changes in place of use, but changes in the other two as well). In short, the effects
that are of concern from these specific permit changes, and that could potentially cause injury and thus be of
policy concern under the statute, are the changes in water availability in the stream to the users of the stream.
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2.

The Water Right as a "Use Right"

Precisely speaking, then, a water right is not a right to use water. A water
right is (1) a right (2) to use (3) running water. It is a right to use a watercourse,
to avail oneself of its fruits by diversion, which thereafter provides (1) an
opportunity (2) to use beneficially (3) the diverted water. The former is the use
entitled by the water right, the latter, the use that is enabled by its exercise.
Hutchins articulated the former right of use clearly: "The right one may acquire
with respect to water flowing in a stream is a right to its use, which
will be
4
regarded and protected as property. This right is strictly usufructuary.""
One uses a watercourse by diverting water from it."5 Diversion is the use,
and the detached substance of the water is the "fruit" that the running water
yields: water reduced to possession by diversion and no longer physically part of
the watercourse to which the water right attaches. The beneficial use of water, on
the other hand-the second "use" with which water rights doctrine is
concerned-is the use of diverted water: diverted water applied to personally
profitable and socially productive ends.
3.

Diversion and the Resultant Rights of Possession and Ownership

Obviously, the key point in the relationship between the property right to use
running water and the use of water separated from the stream is the physical act
of diversion, the act entitled by the water right. Before this point, the law
recognizes no private right in the molecules of water flowing in the stream,
molecules that are in their way ferae naturae and incapable of possession.
Beyond the point of diversion, physical possession confers a true and complete
property in the parcel of water severed from the watercourse." 6 Many different

Interestingly, the ambiguity in the term "water" appears elsewhere in the opinion, but in a different
context where it raises yet a third meaning of the word. In a passing comment, the court embraced the inclusion
of "flow" as a characteristic or parameter of "water quality" because (quoting the SWRCB in its 1995 Water
Quality Control Plan, which also considers "diversion" a water quality characteristic), "the rate and quantity of
flow ... are physical properties of the water" that can adversely impact beneficial uses. Id. at 710 (emphasis
added). The policy focus and sense of "the water" in "water quality," however, is the condition or character of
the substance of the water in the watercourse, referred to as the "water column." Water quality parameters of
the water column are traditionally its chemistry, constituents, and physical character (principally temperature).
Flow, on the other hand, its quantity, rate, velocity, direction, etc., are not characteristics of the water column
but of the watercourse itself. The physical behavior of the watercourse, including flow, depth, stage, and other
aspects of riverine hydrodynamics, are certainly of public and regulatory concern; but they are concerns that fall
more naturally and fittingly within the policy and legislative frameworks of water rights, flood control, and
navigation, and far less so within the sphere of water quality policy interests and concerns, such as "pollution,"
"contamination," and "degradation."
114. HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW, supra note 72, at 37 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
115. Thus, a water right holder "uses" a watercourse in precisely the same way that the holder of a profit
prendre "uses" a servient tenement: by taking material from it. See infra Part lI.A.4.
116. Wiel describes the water right as a link, a "transition from nobody's property to private property, by
capture and severance from the stream .... The right may exist to have its [naturally flowing water] flow and
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rights can potentially attach to water after it has been diverted from the stream,
but only one kind of right operates at the interface of nature and human
instrumentality and exists in "water" before it is diverted: the water right.
Diversion is not an end in itself any more than mining for gold or drilling for
oil, but is a means to an end. The ultimate human and social object of diversion is
the use of the captured molecules of water for their chemical, thermal, and
hydraulic properties, i.e., for beneficial use. For all of the reasons that it is natural
to link the water right to divert water from a watercourse with putting water to
beneficial use, and for all of the times the two have been so readily merged
"the
together in phrases such as "the right to divert and use water,"'
8
'
appropriative right is a right of beneficial use,"" or the "right to use water," the
fact that there is a complete legal disjuncture between the property right in the
stream and the property right in the water diverted from the stream may seem
counterintuitive. The mind that can clearly see that the fruit of an apple tree is an
apple, and not apple pie, may yet have difficulty accepting that the fruit of the
watercourse is water and not water beneficially used.' 9 But the truth is, this kind
of legal disjuncture is quite ordinary, and examples of it abound.
The common law offers many examples of rights very similar in nature to
water rights in which one also finds an identical discontinuity between
nonpossessory rights of use and the possessory interests that their exercise
creates. The fact that the water right is (1) a right of use (2) in a resource that the
right holder does not own, invites a natural and instructive comparison with
easements-the most common and familiar of nonpossessory use rights-and, in
particular, with that category of easements known as profits Aprendre.

use, and to take of it (called usufructuary). Any part taken is the private property of the possessor while in his
possession." WIEL, supra, note 1, at 755. The physical act of diversion, besides being the particular act entitled
by the water right, also constitutes the exercise of a legal power that creates new legal rights. This aspect of
diversion is discussed below.
117. Even Professor Trelease refers to "rights to abstract and use the water of streams." FRANK J.
TRELEASE, WATER LAW 10 (2d ed. 1974).
118. Huffordv. Dye, 162 Cal. 147 (1912).
119. Hutchins, for example, seemed to experience a similar intuitive discomfort in reporting Nevada
County & Sacramento Canal Co. v. Kidd, 37 Cal. 282 (1869), which quite sensibly held that the water right and
the physical works of diversion are different things, capable of different injuries, different causes of action, and
different remedies, commenting: "Even though the water right and the ditch right are separate property rights, it
is true that they are closely related, for under most circumstances the exercise of the water right depends upon
the use of some method of diverting and conveying the water." HUTCHINS, 2 WATER RIGHTS LAWS, supra note
6, at 164, 165 (emphasis added). Strictly speaking, the comment is neither true nor logical. Of course one may
interfere with the exercise of a diversion right by interfering with the physical means of diversion as well as by
interfering with the streamflow. But Hutchins' conclusion that the rights themselves are therefore related does
not follow. That the exercise of an incorporeal real property right to enter upon land and drill for oil is
dependent upon having a right to the use of the necessary drilling equipment does not mean that the rights
themselves, qua rights, are related. One may suppose the same kind of intuitive urge to "connect" the
nonpossessory right to divert water from a watercourse with the possessory right to use the diverted watereven though they are, in reality, "separate property rights."
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4.

The Water Right and the Profit t Prendre

Like the water right, the affirmative easement is a nonpossessory right of use
in a resource one does not own.'20 Much closer still to the water right is the subset
of affirmative easements known as "profits Aprendre."
An affirmative easement is the nonpossessory right to use the land of
another-that land being called the "servient tenement."'' 2' The profit A prendre

(also called simply a "profit") is the species of easement in which the particular
of something from
use entitled to be made of the servient tenement is the taking
22
material.
other
or
products,
forest
gas,
and
oil
it: minerals,
a.

The Nonpossessory Use Right Is the Right to Take

"A prendre," like the verb "to appropriate," means to take.'23 The land in
which the right exists-the servient tenement-is to the profit what the

watercourse is to the water right. Land is the subject matter of the right, and the
nonpossessory right to use land one does not own by mining and taking minerals
or cutting and taking timber from land under a profit is no different from the
nonpossessory right to use a watercourse one does not own by diverting and

taking water from the watercourse under a water right. The profit, then, is a ready
example from the common law of (1) a nonpossessory (2) right of use (3) in a
resource or subject matter one does not own, where (4) the "use" is the taking of
something from the resource. 121
b. A Right in the Realty/Resource-Not in the Materialto Be Taken
The essential property aspects of water rights and profits track very closely.
Figure 1 shows their virtual identity. The property of a mineral profit, for

120. A negative easement, on the other hand, limits the owner's use of the servient estate for the benefit
of the dominant estate. WILLIAM E. BURBY, REAL PROPERTY 64 (3d ed. 1968). Today, "easement" refers
almost universally to affirmative easements only; negative easements are now categorized as restrictive
covenants. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 12, 14 (1998).
121. CAL. CIV. CODE § 803 (West 1997).
122. "A profit Aprendre is an easement that confers the right to enter and remove timber, minerals, oil,
gas, game, or other substances from land in the possession of another." 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY,
supra note 120, at 12; see also Gerhard v. Stephens, 68 Cal. 2d 864 (1968); Westlake v. Silva, 49 Cal. App. 2d
476 (1942); CAL. CIV. CODE § 801, 802 (items 2 fishing, 3 taking game, 5 taking water, wood, minerals, and
other things, and easements in gross); BURBY, supra note 120, at 62. Although earlier cases distinguished the
profit Aprendre from easements, the California Civil Code classifies profits as a type of easement.
123. "A prendre" is a French adjectival construction meaning "to take." DICTIONNAIRE MODERNE
FRAN AIS-ANGLAIS/ANGLAIS-FRAN AIS 1, 563 (1960).
124. There is no material difference between riparian rights (or overlying groundwater rights) and oil
and gas profits in California. For both, land ownership is necessary to provide access, and oil and gas in the
ground, like groundwater, are not themselves susceptible of possession or ownership, even by the overlying
owner: "'Like water [gas and oil are] not the subject of property, except while in actual occupancy ....' Ohio
Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 207 (1900) (quoting People's Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind. 277, 281 (1892)).
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example, is the use right in the land where the minerals are located-not a right
in the minerals themselves. Similarly, the property of the water right is the use
right in the watercourse and not a property or estate in the corpus of the water
itself. Case law provides some illustrative examples. In the Tennessee case of
Stanton v. Herbert, the court distinguished between the grant of an exclusive
right to sand and gravel (creating a possessory estate in the sand and gravel itself)
from the grant of a non-exclusive right to take the material, which created a
nonpossessory profit Aprendre. The profit was not a right in the sand and gravel;
25
it was a right in the land it burdenedto take sand and gravel from the land.'
c. New Title (Ownership) Createdin the Material Taken
The consequences of taking material are also the same for water rights and
profits Aprendre. Severance from the source creates a title in that which has been
severed. In Stanislaus Water Co. v. Bachman,126 the court compared water in
nature to the natural occurrence of timber, minerals, rocks, oil, and clay and
described the property transformation that occurs when these resources are
severed from the earth and reduced to possession. Undisturbed, they are a part of
the realty to which they are affixed. But severed, they become personalty,
property separate and apart from the land or watercourse from which they were
detached. The court found the same transformation to be true for water: "The
business of collecting water in reservoirs and conducting it in pipes to houses of a
city ... is a process of severing the water from its connection with the earth and
changing it into personal property.,, 127 The court then quoted from the earlier case
of Heyneman v. Blake: "Water when collected in reservoirs or pipes and thus
separated from the original source of supply is personal property, and is as much
the subject of sale-an article of commerce-as ordinary goods and
merchandise."' 2

125. Stanton v. T. L. Herbert & Sons, 141 Tenn. 440 (1918); see also Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d 110
(1935); Western Oil & Refining Co. v. Venago Oil Corp., 218 Cal. 733, 738, 741 (1933).
126. 152 Cal. 716 (1908).
127. Id. at 726. The point in Stanislaus was not to say that all severed material is necessarily personalty,
but to emphasize that a new, possessory property in the material is created when it is severed from the servient
estate. The property could just as easily be realty as personalty, if, for example, the profit were appurtenant to a
dominant estate or the water right appurtenant to a place of use. It just would not be real property in the servient
estate. See HUTCHINS, THE CALIFORNIA LAW, supra note 72, at 38-39.

128. 19 Cal. 579, 594 (1862). The court in Stanislaus, however, found that the contract in question,
which expressly declared itself to be a covenant running with the land, of perpetual duration, and inuring to the
benefit of the contractor's heirs and assigns was, not surprisingly, not simply a sales agreement but the
conveyance of an undivided interest in the company's ditch and the water flowing in it. Stanislaus Water, 152
Cal. at 728-29.
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On this property transformation, Wiel observed: "[R]unning water .. . is the
property of no one, but a portion of it taken out of the stream and confined in the
possession of an individual becomes the taker's private property, belonging to
him while under his possession and control.' ' 29 As the court in Bachman
observed, these are the same consequences that result from the taking and
removing of material under a profit and reducing it to the possession of the taker.
In the exercise of a profit to take sand, as in Stanton, excavation detaches the
sand from the servient tenement and reduces it to the personal possession of the
excavator. Upon excavation, the sand is no longer physically connected with or a
legal part of the servient estate and is thus no longer subject to the profit either.
The sand that is taken is owned as personal property of the possessor, and the
possessor may use it or may sell it for use by someone else. 3 °
d. Oil and Gas
The exploitation of oil and gas provides the most expansive body of law on
profits A prendre in California. Moreover, oil and gas are even more closely
comparable to running water than are other minerals or resources because they
too are (1) moving, transient substances with no regard for surface property
boundaries; (2) the object of multiple, concurrent rights; and (3) incapable of
ownership, even by the overlying owner. 3' Where as to the right to take standing
timber or minerals in place the profit and the water right are extremely similar, as
the right to take oil and gas they are virtually identical. 32 The nonpossessory
profit ii prendre to take oil and gas is, like the nonpossessory water right to
appropriate running water, the fullest property the law recognizes in these
fugitive natural resources.'33

129. WIEL, supra,note 1, at 1-2.
130. See Western Oil, 218 Cal. at 741.
131. Id.; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900). Other minerals-those that do not move-are
considered to be owned by the surface owner, under the rule of "ownership in place." As noted above, a grant of
an exclusive right to minerals in place has thus been held to convey a possessory estate in the minerals
themselves, whereas the grant of a non-exclusive mineral right conveys a profit a prendre to the grantee. See
Stanton v. T. L. Herbert & Sons, 141 Tenn. 440 (1919); BURBY, supranote 120, at 62-63.
132. The only way in which they are different is the absence of ownership of the watercourse (i.e., of a
servient estate), an inconsequential difference. See Fig. 1.
133. Thus, the owner of the servient tenement himself has no possessory interest in the "fugacious" oil
and gas resources underlying his land, but only a non-exclusive right to drill and take them from beneath the
surface. In this, the nature of the owner's rights is no different from the nature of the rights of the assignees of
royalties or of oil and gas lessees, which consist only of the right to enter the servient tenement and to explore
for and extract oil and gas therefrom. Gerhard v. Stevens, 68 Cal. 2d 864 (1968); Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal. 2d
110 (1935); Western Oil, 218 Cal. at 741; PG&E v. Zuckerman, 189 Cal. App. 3d 1113 (1987); Lough v. Coal
Oil, 155 Cal. App. 2d 785 (1957).
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As with other profits, the right to take oil and gas from the servient estate
does not include any property in the unextracted substances. Only upon
extracting the material and reducing it to possession in exercise of the profit do
oil and gas become the property of the profit holder. 3 4 In Western Oil, the court
stated:
It is settled law that the lessee under an oil and gas lease [i.e., the profit
holder] acquires no title to the oil and gas in place as part of the realty,
but only a right to enter upon the land, drill wells, and reduce the oil and
gas to possession. When reduced to possession the oil and gas are
personal property, and only then can absolute title vest.'35
Similarly, the builder who may contract to purchase sand for use in
construction from one who holds the right to mine sand from a quarry (but who
has no title in the unmined sand)-no different from the refiner in Richfield with
a contract to purchase the production of oil from an operating lessee-holds no
"sand use-right" in the quarry or in the sand in place. Only upon the exercise of
the profit A prendre, of the right "to take," does his property in the sand itself
arise and thereupon entitle what the profit only enabled: a universe of future
actions, including the beneficial use of the substance taken or the transfer for use
by someone else.
This is the same relationship the appropriative water right bears to the
activities that it enables. Beneficial use is an opportunity enabled, not entitled, by
the water right. The legal character of this particular enablement is discussed in
the next Part.

134.
135.

Richfield Oil Co. v. Hercules Gasoline Co., 112 Cal. App. 431, 434 (1931).
Western Oil, 218 Cal. at 738; see also Ohio Oil, 177 U.S. at 208.
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Fig. 1
Comparison of the Water Right and the Profit APrendre
as Rights of Property
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5. The Water Right as a Power
The profit A prendre presents exactly the same proprietary disjuncture as the
water right: a disjuncture between the nonpossessory right to take and the
ownership of what is taken. Neither the water right nor the profit includes rights
that extend beyond the use of the watercourse or beyond the use of the servient
tenement.
What does inhere in both the water right and the profit i prendre, however, is
a legal power whose exercise creates the new legal rights in what is taken, rights
of ownership that go well beyond the watercourse and the servient tenement.
That power explains and bridges, as it were, the proprietary discontinuity
between the nonpossessory water right and profit on the one hand, and the
possessory rights in the detached substances that arise by virtue of their exercise
on the other. Because the power inheres in the nonpossessory right, the new
rights of necessity flow to the exerciser of that right.
The Restatement of Property defines a "power" as "an ability on the part of a
person to produce a change in a given legal relation by doing or not doing a given
act. ' '3 6 In the case of water flowing in a natural channel, the power to create a
property title in the substance of the water by taking and possessing it lies in the
exercise of the water right itself. The new possessory right in the new res arises

136.

1 RESTATEMENT

OF PROPERTY

6 (1936).

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38

by virtue of, and only by virtue of, (1) the exercise of the power implicit in and
coincident with the exercise of the nonpossessory right of diversion (the water
right) and (2) the resultant fact of capture and possession.' 7 Until the power is
exercised, that is, until water is diverted and possession factually occurs, the new
res-andperforce any property in that res-simply do not exist.
From an entitlement/enablement perspective, the power is simply the legal
mechanism for enabling those actions that require new or changed legal
relationships. The exercise of the power that creates ownership of the substance
taken enables all that the new ownership itself entitles (and may, in turn, further
enable) with regard to that substance-including possessory rights of use.
Another traditional example of this kind of power is the power conferred by a
hunting license: the license itself confers no property in wild game, but inherent
in the right to hunt is the power to reduce a wild animal to possession and thereby
create a new property in it. As has been discussed, a hunting license is also very
similar to the water right in that wild animals, like flowing water, are a moving,
unfixed part of nature (ferae naturae) and incapable as such of possession or
ownership. The right to take in both instances, i.e., the water right and the
hunting license, are rights with which the powers are coincident.'38
Useful reference may also be made to the earlier example of the power a
person has to acquire title to merchandise offered for sale in a store by paying the
store its price.' In that particular example, shopping at the store first requires the
acquisition of a store "membership." Membership, then, confers both the right to
use the store-to enter and make purchases in it-and the coincident power to
acquire title to merchandise in the store through the act of purchase. But, like the
profit A prendre, the hunting license, and the water right, store membership of
itself confers no property and no "use-rights" in the merchandise sitting, untaken,
on the store's shelves. The member has no rights in that merchandise until he
purchases it. Much less could the member transfer a property right in the
unbought merchandise to a third party by entering into a contract to supply
merchandise yet to be purchased from the store.

137. An intent to exercise dominion (animus domini) is also a necessary ingredient for legal possession
and for the new property title. See HOLMES, supra note 47; Radin, supra note 107, at 218-29.
138. Wiel discusses the English and American common law commentaries that compare the law of
water rights to the law of wild animals. WIEL, supra note 1, at 755-57.
139. This power is not usually coincident with any legal right-it is merely the power of any member of
the public to accept the offer of goods for sale by tendering the stated price. See ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN,
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS 129-30. (rev. ed. 1990).
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6.

"Water-Use Rights": Property Rights in Water Taken from a
Watercourse

DWR acquires rights of possession and ownership in the water it diverts
from the Delta into its facilities upon exercise of the right of diversion-but not
until then. These are the same right and title that DWR exercises as it conducts
water through its aqueduct to its contractors, and the same property right it
transfers to its contractors once they take possession of the water from DWR at
their turnouts pursuant to their water supply contracts. It is the same property
right the plaintiffs hold and exercise as they put the water to use or deliver it to
others to use: not a water right in the stream, but ownership rights of the water
they have come to possess, delivered pursuant to the water supply contract with
DWR.
If one desired to coin a phrase, "water-use right," to mean the property right
to make beneficial use of water, it would be the same kind of right of use that
inheres in the ownership of any thing, of any res-in the case at hand, in the
ownership of the parcel of water to be used. Under no construction of contract or
of transfer by operation of law could the plaintiffs' ownership rights or the
ownership rights through which they claimed have arisen before that water was
diverted by DWR and reduced to possession. There existed no property at all in
"that water."
DWR's water rights in the Delta, its property rights to divert water
therefrom, were significantly affected by the ESA restrictions on diversion. But,
while ESA regulation significantly affected the Tulare plaintiffs' contractual
expectations and resulted in a definite and quantifiable pecuniary loss to them,
under the facts of the Tulare case, they could not have been deprived of "wateruse rights" in water never diverted because a property was never created in that
water. On the other hand, the property rights DWR acquired in the water it was
able to divert (and thereafter transferred to the plaintiffs through delivery of
possession of the diverted water) were, of necessity, not affected at all. Thus,
property in water, the existence of which is wholly contingent upon diversion,
upon the exercise of a power that creates that property, could not have been
"occupied," "invaded" or "destroyed" by regulatory actions that prevented
diversion from occurring in the first place.' °

140. Although a taking per se must therefore be ruled out, this still leaves unaddressed whether the
plaintiffs' loss constituted a regulatory taking, a question the court had no reason to reach and did not in fact
take up. It would seem, however, that once the plaintiffs' assertion of a property right in the subject matter of
the contract (i.e., the water-use right) is rejected, the basis for distinguishing Omnia disappears. Since the
contract passed no property right or title, then, under the rule in Omnia, the plaintiffs would have nothing more
than non-compensable contractual expectancies. See generally Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261
U.S. 502 (1923). If the case had involved a regulatory takings analysis of the impairment of a water right or
water rights, it should be clear that the issue should have been framed as a diminution in the value or usefulness
of the whole nonpossessory diversion right rather than (as the decision framed it) as an occupation or
destruction of a specific right in the individual molecules lost.
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B. Beneficial Use as a Legal Requirement
In addition to being the individual motive for diversion, as well as the
activity that diversion enables the diverter to engage in, beneficial use plays
several other very key, and in fact paramount, institutional roles in California
water rights law. In these roles beneficial use is an overarching obligation and
condition that the law imposes upon the water right, not to extend it but to limit
it. In none of these roles is beneficial use itself an entitlement of the water right.
In California, the "beneficial use" of water diverted pursuant to an
appropriative water right is required to originate and to perfect an appropriative
water right. 4' It also defines the measure or limit of the perfected appropriative
water right. 4 2 And its continuation is requiredto prevent loss of the right through
forfeiture. 43 This second important role played by beneficial use in appropriative
water rights doctrine is not as an entitlement of the water right, either, but rather
a compulsion of public policy that conditions, limits, and burdens the right. As
Civil Code section 1411, quoted above, states: "The appropriation must be for
some beneficial purpose ..... " The California Constitution says that "the general

welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial use to
the fullest extent of which they are capable." ' 4
The principle of "beneficial use" in California and throughout the West is a
legal condition and requirement placed upon appropriative water right holders to
exercise their water rights and to apply the water thus made available to
beneficial-i.e., to socially valuable-ends. As opposed to riparian rights, if one
is to be allowed to have an appropriative water right, one must exercise
45 it and put
the diverted water to some valuable use, as a matter of public policy.
The reason for this requirement was, and continues to be, simple: water in the
West is scarce. 146 Putting water to use is not just a personal financial opportunity,
it is a social imperative to sustain the economic life of its people. No one is
allowed to monopolize under right a resource as precious as the natural source of

141. Senior v. Anderson, 130 Cal. 290, 296 (1900).
142. "A permit shall be effective for such time as the water actually appropriated under it is used for a
useful and beneficial purpose in conformity with this division, but no longer." CAL.WATER CODE § 1390 (West
1971); Thayer v. Cal. Dev. Co., 164 Cal. 117 (1912).
143. See, e.g., CAL.WATER CODE § 1241.
144. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2 (emphasis added).
145. C.f In re Waters of Long Valley Creek Stream Sys., 25 Cal. 3d 339 (1979). Policy refinements
have created exceptions to the strict "use it or lose it" rule for appropriative rights. As to the general proposition
that riparian rights are not lost through non-use, the Supreme Court in Long Valley suggested that active riparian
use might, under certain circumstances, be required to sustain the right-not by the beneficial use doctrine but
by the constitutional requirement of reasonable use. Id. at 354-55, 355 n. 10.
146. The most salient fact is that in the West, unlike the humid eastern states, it does not rain in the
summer. Irrigation from watercourses (or groundwater basins) has always been a necessity. From the beginning
of settlement, the climate forced reliance on the maximum exploitation of limited water resources in this region
of the country.
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water or to hoard it unused. 47 In California, beneficial use has always been
required to create and to maintain an appropriative water right, first under the
common law and then by statute. It became a constitutional requirement in 1928
when Article 14, section 3 (now Article 10, section 2) was adopted.
In Lux v. Haggin, the California Supreme Court described the creation of
property through the exercise of the appropriative water right and described
beneficial use as an obligation of the right: "The appropriator... by his
appropriation makes the running water his own, subject only to the trust that he
shall employ it for some useful purpose."'4 8
As has been discussed, beneficial use is often confused for the water right
itself. 49 But it is quite distinct. It is a common law, statutory, and constitutional
condition and duty that burdens and limits every appropriative water right in the
state.
C. Summary of "Use"
Whether viewed as a personal opportunity enabled by diversion or as a social
or legal obligation and limitation imposed on the right of diversion, the actual
end use of the water is not itself a right conferredby the water right. The "right"
of the water right is the right to divertfrom the watercourse,and the "fruit" of the
watercourse is the water it gives up to diversion. By contrast, beneficial use is,
first, a possessory right in diverted water that is created by the exercise of the
power implicit in the nonpossessory diversion right and, second, a statutory and
constitutional condition and limitation on appropriative water rights.
Law and policy in California are indifferent as to who satisfies that condition,
the water right holder or someone else. Thirty-five million individual
Californians and thousands of businesses are, every day, end-users of water
obtained through the exercise of someone else's water rights. The plaintiffs-or,
more accurately, the end users whom the plaintiffs ultimately served-needed no
water right to fulfill the condition of beneficial use any more than do the millions
of California urban and residential water users who receive water as a matter of
their public right of service and who use it, beneficially, by turning on their taps
and washing their hands.

147. Smith v. Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 127 (1895).
148. 69 Cal. 255, 309 (1886).
149. Hutchins provides an example: "The right of usufruct of the appropriator is subject to a reasonable
use and consumption of the water for beneficial purposes. Hence, the appropriativeright is a right of beneficial
use." HUTCHINS, 2 WATER RIGHTS LAWS, supra note 6, at 72 (emphasis added). Under the best possible
interpretation of this passage, "usufruct" in the first sentence refers to the usufruct of the stream, making that
sentence correct. The second sentence, however, would be non sequitur.Placing a condition on a right does not
make the condition itself a right. The first sentence put the matter precisely and correctly: the water right is
subject to the requirements of reasonable and beneficial use. They are limits 'on the right, not positive
entitlements of it.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The conclusions of this article examining the matter of water rights as
property, as that inquiry has been directed and focused by the decision in Tulare
v. United States are: that the property right to put water diverted from a stream to
beneficial use is not part of the appropriative water right or of any water right
recognized in California; that DWR held and holds no such entitlement under its
water rights; and that the plaintiffs could not therefore have held such
entitlement, whether by transfer from DWR, by contract, or by operation of law.
Because the broad topic of water law concerns itself with both watercourses
and water taken from watercourses, as well as with the use of each of these kinds
of water, and regularly employs the shorthand "water" and "use" indifferently to
refer to them, it is a subject matter naturally prone to ambiguity and confusion. If
water rights doctrine is somewhat obscure to begin with, the stubborn and
habitual ambiguities in the use of "water" and "use" have greatly increased that
obscurity, as has the unquestioning acceptance and use of the term "usufruct."
The appropriative water right is a nonpossessory property interest in a
watercourse entitling the right holder to use the watercourse by diverting water
from it. It is an interest very much in the nature of a profit Aprendre or of the
right to fish or hunt wild animals and is often described as a usufructuary right in
the watercourse to distinguish it from a right of ownership. The water right
includes no property in the water itself, either before or after diversion. There is
no property of any kind in the substance of the water in a watercourse prior to
diversion. Property in the substance of the water arises only upon its being
diverted and reduced to possession, and then is a possessory title, not a
nonpossessory right of use-i.e., not a water right.
The property rights in the substance of the water that the plaintiffs in Tulare
at some point actually do acquire from DWR, which include the right to make
beneficial use of water, are the constituent rights of ownership and do not even
exist until DWR diverts from the Delta and thereby creates the original property
in it. Moreover, the plaintiffs' own property in the diverted water does not exist
until the water is delivered to them at their canal turnouts, as provided in their
service contracts with DWR, when they, themselves, take possession of it from
DWR. Until then, their rights and their remedies regarding water service are
purely contractual.
Lastly, beneficial use-the application of water to socially useful purposesis not simply the opportunity enabled by the exercise of the water right. From a
water rights perspective, it is a significant policy requirement and condition
imposed by law that must be met to acquire and to keep an appropriative water
right in California. But in neither case, as enablement or requirement, is
beneficial use something that the appropriative water right itself entitles.
Therefore, at the time that ESA regulation limited DWR's opportunity to
divert under its water rights, the plaintiffs-DWR's water supply contractors and
those served by them-had no property rights in the water that was thereby lost
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to diversion, delivery, and use. Upon this analysis, the court in Tulare erred
fundamentally in its characterization of the state-defined property at issue and in
its decision on liability for taking that flowed from that flawed characterization.
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APPENDIX
Summary of the Different Meanings of "Water" and "Use" in Water Rights
Law and Some Suggestions Regarding Usage
1. "Water"
In water rights law, "water" is used in two ways:
-To mean "running water": water flowing in a natural channel; a
watercourse.
-To mean "diverted
water": the substance of the water diverted from a
50
watercourse.1
A. Running Water
1. Running water is incapable of ownership. No one owns it.
2. Running water is not owned by the state, the public, or the people.
3. Running water is incapable of ownership because it is incapable of
possession in its flowing state.
B. Water Diverted from a Watercourse
1. Water diverted from a watercourse is subject to both possession and
ownership.
2. The substance of diverted water can be owned because, unlike
running water, it is capable of physical possession.
II. "Use"
In water rights law, "use" is used in two ways, corresponding to the two
different meanings of "water":
-The use of running water (use of the watercourse).
-The use of diverted water.
A. Use of the Watercourse
1. Synonym for "use of the watercourse": diversion.
2. The water right is the right to use a watercourse.
3. Synonym for water right: diversion right.
4. The right to make use of a watercourse is a nonpossessory right.
5, The right to make use of a watercourse is "usufructuary."
6. Diversion, the exercise of the water right, is the means by which
running water is reduced to possession and made capable of
ownership.
B. Use of Diverted Water
1. The use of diverted water is the exercise of a possessory right
inhering in the ownership/possession of the diverted water.
2. The use of diverted water is not "usufructuary"; it is a possessory
right of ownership.
150. Excluding diversion to storage where the water remains a functional part of the watercourse. The
outline uses the term "diverted water," just as the article has, to mean water diverted from a watercourse and
reduced to possession.
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3.

The use of diverted water for beneficial purposes is both a benefit to the
individual and a requirement of state law and policy
a. It is an opportunity enabled by the water right, but it is not an activity
entitled by the water right.
b. Beneficial use is a common law, statutory, and constitutional
requirement.
c. Beneficial use is a requirement that, in the first instance, limits and
conditions the water right.

III. Usage Suggestions
This article emphasizes the confusion in water rights terminology and
understanding that has been the product of understandable but unfortunate
habits of usage. The following are some of those habits and some specific
suggestions for correcting them.
A. Eliminate from usage the following terms and phrases:
1. Usufruct.
-Substitute: "the nonpossessory right to divert water flowing in a
natural channel."
2. Water-use right.
3. The people/state own the water/runningwater (or similar phrases).
-Substitute: "the nonpossessory right to divert water is the fullest
property right the law recognizes in running water"; adding, as
appropriate, that "the state has a paramount sovereign interest, but
not a proprietary title, in the use of its natural water resources."
4. The water right is a right to use water/to make beneficial use of
water (or similar phrases).
-Substitute: "the water right is a right to divert from a watercourse."
B. Avoid use of the following terms and phrases:
1. The quotation from Eddy v. Simpson, "the right consists not so
much .... "
2. The right to divert and make beneficial use of water (or similar
phrases).
While this shorthand is not so completely objectionable as A.4,
above, and is usually harmless, it gives an incorrect impression of
what the water right is.
-Substitute: "the right to divert waterfor beneficial purposes."
3. Corpus of the water.
This phrase is not discussed in the text as a source of confusion, but
it is implicit in the false distinction made in Eddy v. Simpson and
otherwise stands out as having a potential for causing
misunderstanding. In property law, the term "corpus" is most
immediately suggestive of a trust, whose "corpus" is a single
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property res in which there exists both the legal ownership of the
trustee and the equitable right of the beneficiary to the use of the
corpus (usually in the form of the trust's income stream). In water
cases, however, when the absence of property in the "corpus" of the
water is contrasted with the water right as a use right, it is not a
matter of there being a single res divided into legal and equitable
parts. It is a matter of there being two different res: (1) the substance
of the water (the "corpus") in which there is no property before
diversion; and (2) the watercourse in which only a right of use exists
(but not an equitable right of use). Unlike a trust, the use right is not
in the corpus of the water in a watercourse-"corpus" meaning the
substance of the water-but in the watercourse itself. The only right
in or to the use of the corpus of the water is the right of ownership
after water has been diverted and reduced to possession. Thus, it
would seem prudent to avoid the term "corpus of the water" with the
term's confusing suggestion of trusts.
-Substitute: "the substance of the water."

